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LAWYERING PARADOXES: MAKING MEANING OF THE CONTRADICTIONS
Susan Sturm

ABSTRACT
Effective lawyering requires the ability to manage contradictory yet interdependent practices. In
their role as traditionally understood, lawyers must fight, judge, debate, minimize risk, and
advance clients’ interests. Yet increasingly, lawyers must ALSO collaborate, build trust,
innovate, enable effective risk-taking, and hold clients accountable for adhering to societal
values. Law students and lawyers alike struggle, often unproductively, to reconcile these
tensions. Law schools often address them as a dilemma requiring a choice or overlook the
contradictions that interfere with their integration.
This Article argues instead that these seemingly contradictory practices can be brought together
through the theory and action of paradox. After identifying the features of these two practices of
lawyering—called here legality and proactive lawyering—the Article sets out five lawyering
paradoxes that stem from the opposing yet interdependent features of legalistic and proactive
lawyering: paradoxes of thought and discourse; relationship; motivation, mindset, and justice.
Next, the Article shows the consequences of legal education’s tendency to avoid, sidestep, or
downplay these paradoxes. Finally, drawing on existing research and experiences of innovators,
the Article identifies three strategies that can enable students and lawyers to construct a dynamic
tension between legality and proactive lawyering, and in the process build the potential for
transformative learning and meaningful justice.
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INTRODUCTION
From the moment I entered law school, and through four decades as a lawyer and
then a law professor, I have experienced lawyering as a bundle of contradictions. Crossing
the threshold into the legal world in the late 1970s, I found that my dream of paving the way
for a new era of social justice ran headlong into the wall of austere tradition. This tension
between purpose and precedent replayed daily in the classroom during my law school years.
I often found myself frustrated and infuriated by case law and Socratic dialogue, which
instructed that “thinking like a lawyer” meant looking backward rather than forward,
following authority rather than pursuing innovation, and promoting predictability rather
than solving problems. Nonetheless, I absorbed the message that, as lawyers, we would be
expected to find solutions for the world’s most intractable problems. Alongside its
constraining energy, the role of the lawyer would put me in positions requiring that I “think
outside of the box.”
In practice, I continued to grapple with these contradictions. Legal reasoning and
adversary process proved simultaneously necessary and limiting, just as collaboration and
problem solving got me only so far. As a litigator, I was continually buffeted by the need to
fight while cooperating—as part of conducting discovery, orchestrating a trial, or settling a
case. As an assistant to a master in a prison case, I witnessed the court’s power to force
prison officials to pay attention to inhumane and abusive conditions that they had tolerated
without consequence until the court intervened. Yet, the court could not induce the
cooperation and commitment necessary for sustainable change; the force of law that put
prison reform in the spotlight also triggered backlash and resistance that undercut its
power.1
Now, as a law professor, I experience these contradictions in my scholarship and
teaching. In both arenas, I have explored concepts and strategies that move from mindsets of
compliance to creative problem solving, from paradigms of gladiators to those of problem
solvers.2 I have grappled with ways that courts can simultaneously serve as the backstop for
enforcing prescriptions against first generation employment discrimination while creating
the framework to encourage problem solving to address second generation discrimination. 3 I
have proposed ways to integrate problem solving approaches with judicial intervention, and
yet I remain dissatisfied with the strategies proposed to reconcile or resolve the tensions
between informal and collaborative modes of problem solving and more formal and
compliance-based approaches. Those contradictions also surface in my current work to build
the capacity of judges, clerks, and other employees throughout the court system to engage

See Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PENN. L.
REV. 805 (1990); Note, “Mastering” Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L. J. 1062 (1979).
2 See Susan Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations About Women, the Academy,
and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER L. & POL’Y 119 (1997)[hereinafter From Gladiators to
Problem Solvers]; Susan Sturm, Reframing the Civil Rights Narrative: From Compliance to Collective Impact, in
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN STORY (Austin Sarat ed. 2014).
3 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458
(2001).
1
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openly and constructively with race, while also developing a robust compliance process that
holds people accountable when they violate anti-discrimination rules.
As a teacher, every year I witness many students struggling with the contradictions that
buffeted me as a law student. I teach Civil Procedure alongside courses called Lawyering for
Change and Lawyer Leadership: Leading Self, Leading Others, Leading Change. Each
course aims to equip students with capacities fundamental to lawyers’ roles in enabling
constructive human interaction. Yet, on their face, they seem to require opposing capacities,
and to cultivate competing mindsets. Students experienced this disconnect firsthand during an
exercise we conduct on the first day of class in Lawyer Leadership. We divide students into
small groups and ask each group to list the qualities or descriptors that come to mind when they
think of the words “law” and “lawyer.” We then ask them to do the same with the word
“leadership” and “leader.” When we come back together, we ask students what they noticed
about the “Law/Lawyer compared to the Leadership/Leader” lists generated by each group.
Students typically describe lawyers as “competitive,” “aggressive,” “critical,” “adversarial,”
“hard-working,” and “risk-averse.” In contrast, the column for leaders contains descriptors such
as “creative,” “entrepreneurial,” “visionary,” “inspiring,” and “collaborative.” It doesn’t take
long for an observant student to notice that there is virtually no overlap in their “lawyer” and
“leader” descriptors.4
These tensions have taken on particular urgency in the current political moment. Many
are looking to law—and especially the judiciary—as the bulwark against the threat to rule-of-law
values facing the United States and the larger world. At the same time, the legitimacy of those
same institutions is under attack from the highest levels of government. Scholars and students are
faced with the quandary of simultaneously relying on traditional legal institutions, while looking
to political mobilization and community organizing that call into question the legitimacy of those
core institutions. This requires finding ways to address some of the most vexing challenges
facing law schools and the legal profession: How do you find and sustain meaning and
imagination in the face of skepticism built into law’s methodology? How do you pursue justice
through law if the legal system itself is, important respects, unjust? How do you equip law
students and lawyers to navigate the competing call of power and purpose?
I have come to realize that lawyers’ capacity for impact depends upon making sense of,
and being able to forge constructive tension between these oppositional aspects of lawyering.
These core roles and practices simultaneously contradict and depend on each other for the
legitimacy and effectiveness of both. Lawyers play a key role in designing human interaction so
that diverse people can peacefully and effectively govern themselves. They bear responsibility
for helping individuals, organizations, and governments structure their affairs so they can live
and work together, even when they disagree. They are called upon to be problem solvers and
facilitators of human interaction. These informal and facilitative interactions take place in the
shadow of background norms and rules developed by lawyers and legal institutions. When
conflict erupts and relationships break down, law—through lawyers—enforces rules and enables
This dichotomy between Law/Lawyer and leadership/Leader characterizes in legal practitioners’ conceptions as
well. See ROBERT W. CULLEN, THE LEADING LAWYER: A GUIDE TO PRACTICING LAW AND LEADERSHIP (2009)
(reporting similar non-overlapping descriptors when seasoned lawyers asked to describe lawyering and leadership).
4

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477424

5

LAWYERING PARADOXES

25-Oct-19

Draft: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission
.
people to fight without resorting to violence, using adversarial tools to allocate responsibility,
impose judgment, and enforce rules. Effective lawyers must both fight and collaborate, judge and
build trust, debate and design new institutions, minimize risk and enable effective risk taking,
advance clients’ values, and hold clients accountable for adhering to societal values.
Progress has been made in incorporating what I call proactive lawyering into a
curriculum organized around the logic of what I call legality. Although many law schools
continue to be organized around legality’s logic of learning to “think like a lawyer”,5 in recent
years law schools have expanded offerings cultivating proactive lawyering, including clinical
legal education, added experiential learning requirements, and introduced interdisciplinary
offerings and courses focused on problem solving, deal making, and alternative dispute
resolution.6 Some doctrinal teachers incorporate critical methodologies into their teaching, and
experiment with experiential pedagogy in the conventional law school classroom. Most recently,
law schools, including my own, have focused explicit attention on cultivating lawyer-leadership
skills.7
Notwithstanding these developments, most law schools have yet to come to terms with
how to prepare students--and the legal profession--to navigate the tensions between legality and
proactive lawyering.8 They have tended to avoid, sidestep, or downplay the tendency of legality
to crowd out proactive lawyering, and of legal education to undercut efforts to forge a dynamic
tension with the transformative potential. The prevailing strategy for promoting the capacity to
navigate these opposing aspects of lawyering could be called “add and stir.” Much of the
literature either explicitly or implicitly assumes that proactive lawyering can be added into the
law school curriculum as supplements or complementary competencies. A case in point is a
report urging that lawyers “be equipped with a broad range of ‘complementary competencies’
that supplement and expand the ‘core’ competencies of legal reasoning and analysis that have
been traditionally taught in law school and emphasized in legal practice.”9
The complementarity argument goes something like this: The current law school
curriculum (and the accompanying pedagogy) emphasizing the development of legal analytical
skills remains valid, and should remain at the center of the law school curriculum and pedagogy.
It is, however, too narrow. It does not adequately equip students to navigate the array of
challenges they will face in their multiple roles, to take up the leadership that society calls upon
lawyers to exercise, and to do so at a time of increasing volatility, complexity, and urgency.
See Section I(A), infra.
See Section I(B), infra.
7 As of March, 2019, more than 50 law schools reported having some type of leadership programming and/or
courses. Leah Teague, A Message from the Chair-2019, (Mar. 8, 2019), https://sectiononleadership.org/2019/03/,
(last visited Aug. 15, 2019).
8 There are law schools that have faced this challenge head on as part of their creation, such as CUNY Law School,
Northeastern Law School, and more recently, University of California at Irvine. See CUNY LAW SCHOOL,
https://www.law.cuny.edu/about/history/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2019); ABOUT UCI LAW,
https://www.law.uci.edu/about/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2019).
9 BEN W. HEINEMAN, WILLIAM F. LEE, AND DAVID B. WILKINS, LAWYERS AS PROFESSIONALS AND AS CITIZENS:
KEY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, https://clp.law.harvard.edu/assets/Professionalism-ProjectEssay_11.20.14.pdf.
5
6
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Proactive lawyering can be added to the prevailing pedagogy to meet these needs because the
skills associated with learning leadership are compatible with, or at least not opposed to, those
involved in learning how to “think like a lawyer” in the traditional sense of what that means.
Proactive lawyering thus can and should simply be added onto learning to operate in lawyers’
more conventional adjudicatory roles.
This simple strategy of complementarity will not, in my view, work. It sidesteps
fundamental ways that legal education geared toward cultivating conventional legal skills—
“legality” in my sense—necessarily operates in tension with—and sometimes in opposition to—
the kind of learning and practice that must take place for lawyers to perform the facilitative and
problem solving roles they also occupy. Much of the literature promoting proactive lawyering
treats the capacities and mindsets celebrated in the Socratic classroom—judgment,
categorization, critique, risk minimization, and reasoning from precedent—as limitations to be
overcome or minimized. Perhaps most fundamentally, the notions of justice embraced by legality
as opposed to proactive lawyering directly collide, and are often difficult to reconcile.10 The
tendency to downplay these tensions and contradictions—or to throw up one’s hands in the face
of them—underappreciates both the necessity and opportunity presented by naming and
engaging them. Unless these tensions are addressed, features of legal education operating within
the conventional paradigm are likely to marginalize and undercut the efforts to build lawyers’
leadership capacities.
I have come to believe that the concept of paradox holds a key to navigating these
contradictory yet linked aspects of lawyering. A paradox is a statement or proposition with
positions that are conflicting and yet both are true. 11 Paradoxes involve struggle because they call
upon mentalities or practices that tend to interfere with each other, even as they depend upon
each other. A growing body of organizational and change literature offers insights into both how
paradoxes operate and how they can operate virtuously rather than as a vicious cycle. 12 By
definition, paradoxes cannot be resolved or eliminated; their self-referential and cycling quality
is what makes them a paradox.
In key respects, the paradoxical elements of lawyering are built into law’s structure, role,
and practice. At the level of structure, formal and informal constitutions (such as contracts) set
up law both to provide structures and processes enabling people to interact, cooperate, and make
decisions, on the one hand, and to enable people to fight without violence and to abide by
decisions that will be backed by force, on the other. Lawyers sit at the cusp of these paradoxical
functions.13

See Section II(E), infra.
KENWYN K. SMITH AND DAVID N. BERG, PARADOXES OF GROUP LIFE (1987); PETER ELBOW, EMBRACING
CONTRARIES: EXPLORATIONS IN LEARNING AND TEACHING 330 (1986).
12 See Section IB, infra.
13 Robert Cover brilliantly portrayed these dualities as a defining feature of law:
10
11

Law may be viewed as a system of tension or a bridge linking a concept of a reality to an imagined
alternative - that is, as a connective between two states of affairs, both of which can be represented in their
normative significance only through the devices of narrative.
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These tensions also inhere at the level of role. Lawyers are called upon to build, design,
enable cooperation and collaboration, “constitute” governments, contracts, relationships, and
transactions (in the constitution, in deals, in house, and in alternative dispute resolution), solve
problems, and facilitate wise decision-making. They must simultaneously be ready to fight on
behalf of clients, to be the stewards of the adversary process, and to discipline the exercise of the
violence of the state. These roles are in tension. They are also interdependent. Lawyers cannot
conduct a trial without both cooperating and fighting. They cannot steward an effective deal
without both minimizing and facilitating risk taking.
Finally, the practices required for effective lawyering are themselves paradoxical.
Conventional lawyering and leadership will sometimes require competing mindsets, skills, and
practices. Lawyers have to judge while they also listen, enable, and empathize. They have to
create the conditions for growth and learning, even as they set up the processes to locate or cabin
legal responsibility. They have to be in a creative mindset even as they facilitate compliance and
reactive risk avoidance.
The tensions that manifest in the relationship between legality and proactive lawyering lie
at the heart of what makes lawyers distinctive, necessary, and effective. The most successful and
impactful lawyers live in these tensions. The role of law and lawyers fundamentally involves the
capacity to combine these contradictory modes of thinking, acting, and interacting. This capacity
to hold paradox may be what equips lawyers to exercise truly effective leadership. 14 It matters
both for lawyers in more conventional roles, and for those who, over the course of their careers,
will occupy formal leadership roles in the public, private, and non-profit sectors.15 When lawyers
without this capacity occupy leadership roles, that deficit may help us understand the spectacular
failures that unfold when they get stuck on one side or the other of the paradox. The challenge
facing law schools is to figure out how to build that tension—and the capacity to manage it—into
their practices and cultures. Law school can have a profound impact on how lawyers approach
the paradoxical aspects of their roles. It offers a unique opportunity to forge a dynamic
relationship between legality and proactive lawyering.

Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -- Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
See ROBERT J. ANDERSON AND WILLIAM A. ADAMS, MASTERING LEADERSHIP: AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR
BREAKTHROUGH PERFORMANCE AND EXTRAORDINARY BUSINESS RESULTS 82 (2016)(“The ability to hold opposites,
conflict, tension, and polarity, without avoiding them, over-simplifying them or resorting to quick fixes is the
hallmark of leadership.”).
15 DEBORAH L. RHODE AND AMANDA K. PACKEL, LEADERSHIP FOR LAWYERS 3 (2018) (“The most crucial
challenges of our times involve issues of leadership and, in the United States, no occupation is more responsible for
producing leaders than that of law. The legal profession has supplied a majority of American presidents and, in
recent decades, almost half the members of Congress. Although they account for just 0.4 percent of the population,
lawyers are well represented at all levels of leadership, as governors, state legislators, judges, prosecutors, general
counsel, law firm managing partners, and heads of corporate, government, and nonprofit organizations.”) Rhode also
notes that “Americans place lawyers in leadership positions in much higher percentages than other countries.”
DEBORAH L. RHODE, LAWYERS AS LEADERS 3 (2013).
14

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477424

8

LAWYERING PARADOXES

25-Oct-19

Draft: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission
.
This Article argues for naming legality’s dualities, reframing them as paradoxes,
embracing those paradoxes as challenging but necessary, and engaging law schools and the legal
profession in building capacity to navigate these contradictory yet interdependent requirements.
Section I lays out the contrary yet interdependent features of legality and proactive lawyering..
Section II explores what makes those tensions paradoxical. This Section identify five paradoxes
of lawyer leadership—dualities that contradict one another, give rise to, and affect how lawyers
will experience leadership learning: paradoxes of thought and discourse; relationship;
motivation, mindset, and justice. Section III shows the limitations of prevailing strategies for
reconciling the contradictions between legality and proactive lawyering. Finally, drawing on
action research and the literature of paradox and organizational change, Section IV offers three
strategies for enabling law students, law schools, and legal organizations to hold contradictory
messages and mindsets, and for using this paradoxical approach to strengthen and deepen
leadership capacity in lawyers.

I.

DEFINING THE DUALITY

The central argument of this Article is that lawyering entails contradictory yet
interdependent features and practices, and that explicit attention to these tensions matters. I have
identified two constellations of activities that employ different and, in some respects, opposing
logic. Before we can explore the duality’s paradoxical nature, we must first define its two sides.
Legality makes up one side of this duality. Although there is considerable disagreement
about what “thinking like a lawyer” should mean, legality in the conventional sense has a set of
common features. The other side of the duality falls under the umbrella of what I call proactive
lawyering. Housed under this rubric include lawyering situations featuring ways of thinking,
interacting, and practicing that operate in tension with legality.
Section A identifies and briefly describes three defining attributes of legality: formality,
authority, and adversarialism. These pillars of legality’s logic also anchor the contradictions built
into to legal education and lawyering. Section B first identifies the forms of practice falling
under the rubric of “proactive lawyering, and then identifies the features that operate alongside
and, in certain respects, in tension with legality in both the law school curriculum and legal
practice.

A. Lawyering’s Default Paradigm: Adjudicatory Lawyering and the Rule of Law
Legality—a synonym for the rule of law—lies at the heart of conventional legal
education and of law’s claim to legitimacy. 16 Law school initiates students to the legal
I am using “legality” as a descriptive rather than evaluative term, to connote the modes of reasoning and decision
making that characterize widely shared features that define what it means to operate under the rule of law. I am in
good company in using the term “legality” in this manner See, e.g., Lauren Edelman, Legality and the Endogeneity
of Law, in LEGALITY AND COMMUNITY: ON THE INTELLECTUAL LEGACY OF PHILIP SELZNICK (Robert A. Kagan et al
16

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477424

9

LAWYERING PARADOXES

25-Oct-19

Draft: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission
.
profession by schooling them in a distinctive mode of thinking, relating, and motivating action,
which has come to define what it means to “think like a lawyer.” This is conventionally
conceived to mean engaging in formal, adversarial modes of argumentation and decisionmaking, governed by precedent and backed by sanctions.17 The first year curriculum focuses
primarily on teaching students legal reasoning, argumentation, and decision-making as the
operating system for the rule of law, which functions as lawyers’ default mode of thinking and
acting. For many lawyers and commentators, traditional legal method and analysis “should
continue to be at the core of legal education, as well as of any plausible professional licensing
regime.”18
Legality is not limited to adjudication, though the judiciary is the paradigmatic institution
generating its features. Often, students are introduced to administrative, legislative, or
transactional activity by reading appellate decisions assessing the adequacy of decisions by nonadjudicative institutions, and by applying an adversarial mode of inquiry to analyzing the work
of these institutions. Many scholars of administrative decision making, remedies, legislation, and
organizations have embraced rule of law values as a pathway to legitimacy, paved by lawyers
deploying the processes and analytical tools forged in the judiciary. 19 Organizations operating
out of but governed by legal institutions also adopt legality as a way to enhance their
legitimacy.20 Legality frames many lawyers’ approaches to representing organizational clients. 21
It provides the stamp of legitimacy associated with the rule of law.
The literature analyzing what it means to “think like a lawyer”—and how legal education
teaches the mastery of adjudicatory lawyering—focuses on three defining features: formality,
authority, and adversarialism. These features combine to structure how law students, particularly
in their first year, learn to reason, communicate, interact, and orient their learning.22 Together

eds 2002); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961): PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE
(1969).
17 See HEINEMAN, LEE, AND WILKINS, supra note XX, at 9; ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL:
LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER,” (2007); FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER (2009); PHILIP
SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969); Todd D. Rakoff and Martha Minow, A Case for
Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L. REV. 597,608 (2007).
18 HEINEMAN, LEE, AND WILKINS, supra note XX, at 13 (“The special work of law is to identify claims and
obligations that merit official validation and enforcement.”). The MacCrate Report, intended to spark curricular
reform in legal education, states that “law schools should continue to emphasize the teaching of "legal analysis and
reasoning," and "legal research". American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar,
Legal Education and Professional Development - An Educational Continuum, Report of the Task Force on Law
Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (Chicago, 1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report].
19 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 149 (2008); Jonathan Gould, Making Parliamentary
Precedent (unpublished manuscript)(on file with author); Sarah A. Seo, Democratic Policing Before the Due
Process Revolution, 128 YALE L. J. 1 (2019).
20 Edelman, supra note XX; Sim B. Sitkin and Robert J. Bies, The Legalistic Organization: Definitions, Dimensions,
and Dilemmas, 4 ORG. SCI., 345 (1993).
21 Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255, 259, 273 (1990)
(discussing the inadequacy of the partisan role of lawyers in fulfilling the public oriented mission of the profession
that justifies the adversary system in the first place).
22 See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” (2007); Bryant
Garth and Yves Dezelay, Law Schools and the Construction of Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469 (1993); Susan
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they operate as “a now canonical practice of legal analysis”, 23 an operating system that orients
many students’ professional identity as lawyers. These pillars of legality’s logic also anchor the
contradictions built into to legal education and lawyering.

1. Formality
Formality is one of legality’s most visible and defining features. The actors operating
within the legal system occupy formal roles that define their authority and structure their
relationships (lawyer, client, judge, legislator, administrator etc.). Professional and legal norms
dictate how people in different legal positions communicate and relate to each other. For law
students, the legal acculturation process begins by experiencing the formality of space, language,
relationships, and ways of thinking in the classroom and the law school culture. 24 People refer to
each other by role (Judge, Professor) and their interactions often take place in venues that
structure the form and boundaries of interaction among the participants in the adversary process.
The relationships of professor and student, lawyer and client, judge and litigant operate within a
ritualized structure with a prescribed form.25 Learning the law involves becoming acculturated to
these formal rules and practices. 26
Formality also prescribes the prevailing mode of thought for judges, lawyers, and law
students. Legal reasoning—reasoning analogically, formally, and from precedent—is “what
distinguishes lawyers from other sorts of folk.” 27 Legal norms “characteristically satisfy certain
formal conditions—such as generality—which are usually taken to be necessary conditions also
for justice.”28 Legal reasoning proceeds by identifying the relevant legal categories and placing
people’s conduct into those categories. In this sense, formality operates as defining feature of
“the rule of law”: “to move from a non-legal to a legal mode of governance is to move to a
situation where there will be special and explicit concern for treating like cases alike, for
universalization, and for proceeding in a rule like manner.” 29 Although legal analysis has moved
beyond formalism, formality continues to remain alive in legal thought, with its emphasis on
predictability, uniformity of treatment, reasoning from precedent, and transparency. 30

Sturm and Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in a Culture of Competition and
Conformity, 60 Vanderbilt Law Review 515 (2007).
23 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 36 (1996).
24 MERTZ, supra note ; Schauer, supra note , Sturm and Guinier, supra note .
25 MacCrate Report, supra note XX.
26 Mertz documents the socialization process that takes place in the law school classrooms she studied, and the
cumulative impact of those interactions on students’ view of law and lawyering. See MERTZ, supra note.
27 SCHAUER, supra note, at 1.
28 Jeremy Waldon, Does Law Promise Justice? in LEGALITY AND COMMUNITY: ON THE INTELLECTUAL LEGACY OF
PHILIP SELZNICK 110 (Robert A. Kagan, Martin Krygier, and Kenneth Winston eds 2002).
29 Id.
30 SCHAUER, supra note XX, at 24.
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2. Legitimacy grounded in authority
Legality prioritizes rule-based decision-making, precedent, and reliance on authority as
the source of law.31 “A legal system is known by the existence of authoritative rules.” 32
Argumentation and decision making proceed by reasoning from precedent and authority—
essentially backward-looking analytical and logical analysis assessing whether the conduct falls
within the scope of an authoritative legal rule or principle. Decisions turn on the dictates of
written-down rules, applied in new situations. Individual judgment operates under the constraint
of precedent. “It is the precedent’s source or status that gives it force, not the soundness of its
reasoning nor the belief of the instant court that its outcome was correct.”33
Law students and lawyers are socialized to value this mode of thought as fundamental to
what it means to “think like a lawyer.” Students learn to support their arguments for how a case
should turn out with authority and reasoning by analogy to precedent, rather than with what they
think is right or just, might improve the situation, or produce a better outcome. This form of
reasoning is counter-intuitive; it dictates, “[o]utcomes other than those the decision-maker would
otherwise seem to be the best all-things-considered outcome for the case at hand.”34
Authority operates within legality in a second important respect: as a way to enforce
compliance with legal norms. A distinguishing feature of law is its relationship to statesanctioned violence. Legality relies ultimately on the power of the state to enforce norms, and
thus to motivate behavior. Legal actors achieve adherence through the imposition of legal
requirements, the expression of legal duties to comply with those responsibilities, threats of
negative consequences for failing to adhere, and when necessary, coercion. The motivation for
adhering to norms is basically extrinsic, in the form of duty, incentives, threats, and coercion.35
Both of these aspects of authority relate to one crucial function of law: as Larry
Alexander and Frederick Schauer have written, “an important--perhaps the important--function
of law is its ability to settle authoritatively what is to be done.”36 In Philip Selznick’s words, “the
special work of law is to identify claims and obligations that merit official validation and
enforcement.”37

Id. at 5, EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); Katherine Bartlett, Feminist Legal
Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 836 (1990).
32 SELZNICK, supra note , at 5.
33 Id. at 41.
34 SCHAUER, supra note , at 7-8.
35 See Cover, supra note XX, at ; William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule
Regimes, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 42 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Eds.
2006)(“The American legal system stands ready to commit vast resources to the determination and evaluation of
past conduct in order to calibrate present reward or punishment to it”); MALCOM K. SPARROW, IMPOSING DUTIES:
GOVERNMENT’S CHANGING APPROACH TO COMPLIANCE 1 (1994).
36 Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, supra note XX.
37 SELZNICK, supra note at 5.
31
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3. Adversarialism
A third defining feature of legality is adversarialism: two opposing sides put their best
arguments forward, enabling a neutral decision maker to reach a correct decision based on the
merits of those arguments.38 Adversarialism constructs conflict as a contest between competing
positions. Each situation has two opposing sides, and the process will produce a winner and a
loser. Within the adversary model, lawyers are understood to have a fiduciary duty to advance
the interests and improving the situation of one party as against the interests of the opposing
party.39 Lawyers’ ethical responsibilities to their clients stem from commitment to the adversary
system, incarnated in the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.40
From the outset, students learn that the adversary process is the gold standard for the rule
of law. In the conventional law school classroom, adversarial conflict provides the underlying
framework of interaction, knowledge generation, and problem solving. As presented in most law
school classes, law addresses conflict in highly formal settings aimed at determining winners and
losers. Problems are converted into binary options, and they are “resolved” by using authority
and rigorous analysis to test the strength of those options. Competition functions to establish
truth. The adversary process and rank ordering define success as winning that competition—in
class, in an argument, in the courtroom, or elsewhere.
The conventional law school classroom mirrors adjudication’s adversarial, formal idea of
conflict. The professor structures interactions with students by invoking the style of an appellate
judge who questions lawyers representing one side or the other to ferret out the weaknesses in
their positions and validate winning arguments. 41
The adversary process holds a special place in the prevailing professional and public
understanding of what it means to be governed by the rule of law.42 Felix Frankfurter’s oft-cited
quote from Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath conveys the essence of the commitment to
adversarialism as a hallmark of legality: “No better instrument has been devised for arriving at
truth than to give a person in jeopardy of a serious loss notice of the case against him and

For a discussion of the origins and operation adversary process in American Law, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973); AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE (2017); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A
DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984). For a summary of critiques, see Carrie Menkel Meadow, The Trouble With the
Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996).
39 Id.; Gilson and Mnookin, supra note , at 551 (“In the litigation context, the client's preferred position is given
shape through the norm of zealous advocacy: the lawyer must vigorously assert the client's interests; the final
authority on important issues of strategy rests with the client; and the client may discharge his lawyer at will, but the
lawyer has only limited ability to withdraw from representation.”); Geoffrey Hazard, Lawyer for the Situation; 38
VAL. U. L. REV. 377, 378 (2004).
40 William H. Simon, Role Differentiation and Lawyers’ Ethics: A Critique of Some Academic Perspectives,
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics (2010).
41 See MERTZ, supra note XX; SCHAUER, supra note XX.
42 See id; sources cited in note XX, supra.
38

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477424

13

LAWYERING PARADOXES

25-Oct-19

Draft: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission
.
opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for generating the feeling, so important
to a popular government, that justice has been done.’’43
Legality’s defining features—formality, authority, and adversarialism—orient students
to the legal profession and shape how many in the legal profession understand what it means to
“think like a lawyer.” Legality casts a shadow over non-adjudicatory aspects of lawyering, such
as negotiations and client counseling. 44 These defining features also figure prominently in the
popular understanding of law and lawyering. 45 In conventional pedagogy, jurisprudence, and
scholarship, legality is often contrasted with other modes of thought and decision making—
politics, personal preferences, bargaining, mediating, organizing, managing—as a way of
differentiating law from other modes of decision making, and aspiring to make good on
legality’s promises of predictability, generality of understanding and application, legitimacy, and
order.46
Though legality has endured as the default logic in most law schools, it has been the
focus of waves of critique by legal scholars, educational reformers, and students. 47 Legal realists
criticized the court-centered and formalistic focus of legality, both in practice and in legal
education, and sought to widen or shift the focus to include systematic empirical study,
sociological jurisprudence and the legislative realm.48 Critical legal scholars, critical race
theorists, and feminist theorists have challenged basic assumptions underlying legality–that
politics could be separated from law, that law operates neutrally, and that legal doctrine rather
than power and ideology dictates judicial outcomes.49 Commentators have criticized legality for
its disconnection from practice and its failure to prepare students for the full array of
competencies required for effective lawyering. Legality conveys an overly narrow idea of
lawyers’ roles, if it addresses lawyering at all. These critiques have prompted the introduction of
courses that extend beyond legality, with features quite different from those called for by
legality.

341 U.S. 123, 171-72(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979);
ROBERT MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET, AND ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000).
45 Miriam Webster’s definition of law embodies legality’s features:
43
44

Law is a binding custom or practice of a community; a rule or mode of conduct or action that is prescribed
or formally recognized as binding by a supreme controlling authority or is made obligatory by a
sanction (as an edict, decree, rescript, order, ordinance, statute, resolution, rule, judicial decision, or usage)
made, recognized, or enforced by the controlling authority.
See UNGER, supra note , at 65. Roberto Unger eloquently summarizes this animating idea of contemporary law
and legal doctrine “as a binary system of rights of choice and of arrangements withdrawn from choice the better to
make the exercise of choice real and effective.” Id. at 27.
47 I am indebted to Jed Purdy for this way of organizing the critique of legality.
48 SEE JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 161-62 (1949); Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step,
30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
831 (2008).The realist critique is summarized in SCHAUER, supra note XX, at 124-34.
49 DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY (1983); UNGER, supra, note XX.
46
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B. Legality’s Duality: Proactive Lawyering
Although legality has maintained its canonical status in legal education, lawyers and
academics alike recognize that law and lawyering also entail ways of thinking, relating, and
practicing that do not conform to legality’s conventions. Though these practices occur in
different venues, they share features requiring overlapping competencies and roles that can be
cultivated systematically if they are recognized as part of the same field of practice. These
lawyering practices also bear a similar relationship to legality: they both conflict with legality’s
defining features and are integrally linked with legality’s operation.
This Article uses the term “proactive lawyering” as the umbrella for the full range of
lawyering activities that involve taking the steps needed to meet needs, address problems, and
achieve goals.50 Proactive means “acting in anticipation of future problems, needs, or changes.”
I also use “proactive” as an acronym, to convey the range of roles and practices that lawyers
engage in that share these features:

P

R

O

A

C

Problem
solver

Researcher

Observer

Advisor

Counselor
Capacity
builder

Reflective
practitioner

T

I

V

Translator

Intermediary

Values
maximizer

Transaction
engineer

Institutional
designer

E
Enabler
Educator
Ethicist

Change
agent

Information
integrator

This section first catalogues the domains that regularly employ proactive lawyering. It
then identifies three features that characterize proactive lawyering: informality, a focus on
efficacy, and collaboration.

1. A map of proactive lawyering domains
Proactive lawyering currently operates in a variety of domains falling both within and
beyond conventional legal practice.

Other options that have been proposed as an umbrella term include problem solving, holistic lawyering,
professionalism, lawyer leadership. For a discussion of the limitations of these alternatives and relationship of
proactive lawyering to lawyer leadership, see Susan Sturm, Leadership by Any Other Name (work in progress).
50
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a. Policy analysis built into legal decision making
Even within legal doctrinal analysis, modes of thinking beyond conventionally defined
legality come into play. As legal theorists and critics have noted, classic legal reasoning
(meaning using logic, analysis, analogy, and precedent to decide cases) cannot actually resolve
cases where the legal rule is ambiguous, the situation is complex, and competing policies dictate
different outcomes. Where there is no clear rule or applicable precedent, courts and lawyers must
grapple with competing values. 51 Some mode of decision-making beyond logic and analogy is
needed to select among these competing values.52
Commentators and critics have pointed out contradictions between conventional legal
reasoning and the methodology needed to grapple effectively with conflicting values and policies
in the context of judicial decision making. 53 At a more basic level, law in the more formal sense
takes on its meaning through communal narratives, even as though norms are nurtured outside
law and may be undermined by official legal rules and the processes that enforce them.54

b. Aspects of adjudication requiring practices beyond legality
Although legality structures the logic of analysis and decision making in adjudication, the
processes required for adjudication to occur, as well as for giving force to resulting judgments,
cannot proceed only through legality. They require more collaborative, informal, and facilitative
modes of thought, interaction, and practice. Interactions with the client leading up to litigation
involve advising, counseling, and fact gathering.55 Discovery and trial preparation also
contemplates non-adversarial, forward-looking interactions with opposing counsel, experts, and
potential witnesses. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure demand that lawyers work
together at every critical juncture of litigation.56 The rules, along with mutual self-interest, also
yield incentives and processes to induce settlement.57 Indeed, most cases settle, meaning that
even for litigators, lawyers will spend much of their time involved in informal interactions aimed
at achieving effective resolution, which in turn requires cooperation with client and adversary. 58
Remedies, particularly injunctive remedies, also call upon courts and lawyers to construct
forward-looking solutions that can effectively address legal violations.59

51UNGAR,

supra note XX; Dorf, supra note XX.
See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 10-11 (2005) (quoted in Robert Post and Reva
Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash 42 HARV. CIV. R. CIV. LIB. L. REV. 373 (2007).
53 UNGER, supra note , at 42.
54 Cover, supra note XX; Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L, J, 1860, 1866
(1987).
55 DAVID A. BINDER, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS (1991).
56 See, e,g. F.R.C.P. Rules 16, 26, 37, 68.
57 Gilson and Mnookin, at 516.
58 Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts,
3 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459–570 (2004).
59 Susan Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies; Joanne Scott and Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts;
Rethinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 Colum. J. European L. (2007).
52
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c. Non-legalistic judicial arenas
A panoply of judicial arenas—some old and some new—operate with a logic that emphasizes
problem solving and conflict resolution, and do not conform in significant respects to the pillars
of legality envisioned by the first-year curriculum. Family court,60 juvenile court, problem
solving courts 61 (such as drug courts and homelessness courts), and bankruptcy courts all depart
significantly from legality’s modus operandi.62 They use informal processes. Their focus is on
problem solving and remediation. Their method relies heavily on collaboration and strives to
minimize adversarialism. In addition, many litigants proceed pro se; many court systems have
adapted their roles and practices to adapt to this reality, often in ways that do not hew closely to
the demands of legality.63

d. Non-adjudicative legal practice
Alongside their roles in processing adversary conflict, law and lawyers are called upon to
structure and facilitate human interactions enabling individuals, groups, communities, and
polities to achieve shared goals, produce value, and solve problems. Many aspects of legal
practice operate outside of the confines of the legality framework, and require different mindsets,
competencies, and practices. Alternative dispute resolution takes place both in the shadow of the
law and outside the formal legal system. 64 Mediation and negotiation are a mainstay of legal
practice. These processes and practices come into play both as an explicit form of conflict
resolution and in the process of everyday interactions with clients, collaborators, and adversaries.
Lawyers also are engaged in problem solving as a crucial aspect of their counseling,
facilitation, advising, and intermediary roles.65 They help clients, organizations, communities,

Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1015, 1055 (2004).
60 ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF
CUSTODY 52-54 (1992).
61 Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 831 (2000); Judith Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How Courts are
Run, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 851 (1997).
62 Amy J. Cohen, Family, the Market, and ADR, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL 91, 100-101 (2011).
63 Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Studying the New Civil Courts, 2018
WISC. L. REV. 249 (2018).
64 See, e.g., CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL (2005);
MNOOKIN, PEPPET, AND TULUMELLO, supra note XX; THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR
THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 616 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider and Chistopher Honeyman, eds. 2006).
65 PAUL BREST AND LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS (2010); Carrie Menkel-eadow, The Lawyer as Problem
Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and NonPartisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 793–94
(1999); Sturm, supra note XX, at XX.
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and systems address problems in the classic sense (an issue that requires resolution) as well as
problems in the sense of something that has gone awry and requires remediation.
Transactional lawyering and lawyers representing organizations certainly employ legality as
part of their practice, but their roles and relationships are much more facilitative and oriented
toward enabling clients to achieve their aims. 66 They add value by sharing non-legal knowledge,
facilitating collaboration, serving as intermediaries, building trust, problem solving, and
designing systems of mutual accountability and problem solving. All of these aspects of
transactional lawyering call for informal, constructive, integrative, and forward-looking modes
of thinking, relating, and motivating practice. Lawyers representing organizations (both forprofit and non-profit) operate both inside and outside the legality frame, using mindsets and
strategies focused on enabling the organization to achieve its goals while minimizing legal risk. 67
Human rights practice is another area that calls upon lawyers to play roles beyond legality.
Core human rights practices call for changing norms and practices through political mobilization
and building the capacity of directly affected communities to advocate on their own behalf.68
Human rights practice thus rests upon multidimensional lawyering, using informal norms,
building alliances, marshaling public opinion, building the capacity of directly affected
communities to advocate on their own behalf, and marshalling informal incentives and tools to
hold individuals, corporations, and governments accountable, realize rights, and advance change.
Movement lawyering and social change lawyering increasingly involves these multidimensional strategies and roles, operating alongside side law reform and litigation strategies. 69
Although litigation continues to play a central role in social change work, lawyers and legal
scholars utilize an array of methods, with litigation embedded in a broader theory of change
aimed at having impact.

e. New forms and institutions of legal decision making
Finally, law and lawyering practices and roles are adapting to the demands of highly
complex, uncertain, and troubled times by forging new forms that can accommodate volatility,
complexity, and uncertainty. These forms recognize the limits of conventional legality as a way
to address complex problems, and emphasize the development of institutional architecture that
supports collaboration, peer-to-peer learning, experimentation, and adaptability. Legality’s limits

Gilson and Mnookin, supra.
See BJARNE P. TELLMANN, BUILDING AND OUTSTANDING LEGAL TEAM: BATTLE TESTED STRATEGIES FROM A
GENERAL COUNSEL 254-68 (2017).
68 JO BECKER, CAMPAIGNING FOR JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY IN PRACTICE (2013); TRICIA CORNELL, KATE
KELSCH, NICOLE PALASZ, NEW TACTICS IN HUMAN RIGHTS (2004).
69 Suzanne Goldberg, Multidimensional Advocacy as Applied: Marriage Equality and Reproductive Rights, 29
Colum. J. Gender & L. 1, 7 (2015); Austin, Chu, and Liebman, supra note XX.
66
67
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have also prompted some scholars to call for an expansion of what we mean by legality to
include institutional reimagination and redesign.70
Some of this work focuses on expanding or rethinking the role of the judiciary, to operate in
dynamic relationship with other institutional actors that develop effective modes of problem
solving and innovation.71 Some focuses on linking informal dispute resolution and problem
solving with the process of generating public norms.72 Some focuses on constructing and linking
intermediary institutions and “organizational catalysts” that will spur on going learning, mutual
accountability, and adaptive norms.73 These new forms, emerging in both theory and practice,
call for more collaborative, creative, and learning-focused modes of law and lawyering.

2. Proactive lawyering’s defining features
The lawyering practices discussed in the previous section share important attributes. They
are all aimed at enabling individuals, groups, and institutions to achieve their goals and
aspirations in a world shaped but not fully defined by law.
This section describes three key features of proactive lawyering practices and roles: (1)
informality, (2) legitimacy grounded in efficacy, and (3) collaboration. Each of these modes of
practice operates in tension with a core feature of legality.

a. Informality
Proactive lawyering contrasts with legality in its emphasis on informality. It does not
proceed according to fixed roles and rules. Roles are defined functionally rather than formally.
These processes call for flexibility and adaptability in both roles and mode of thinking, and the
capacity to tailor the mode of reasoning and relationship to the demands of the situation.
Stakeholders participate directly rather than only through an intermediary. These modes of
thought and action emphasize adaptability rather than adherence to established procedure. The
modes of interaction are designed to encourage relationships that foster trust and connection.
Whereas legality calls for prescribed modes of interaction and relationships defined by roles,
non-legalistic processes rely on effective communication, experimentation, and interactions that
See, e.g., Michael Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1998); Minow and
Rakoff, supra note XX.
71 See Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1055 (2004); Joanne Scott and Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts; Rethinking the Judicial Role
in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUROPEAN L. (2007).
72 Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503,
523 (2008); Susan Sturm and Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. DISP.RESOL. 1.
73 Grainne De Burca and Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law, and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND
NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 2-3 (Grainne de Burca and Joanne Scott, ed. 2006); Susan Sturm, The
Architecture of Inclusion, Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 287
(2006).
70
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build understanding, learning, and capacity to work together. Participation is defined not by
formal status (party, attorney of record, judge) but by the stake an individual might have in
addressing an issue and their power to affect the desired outcome (either positively or
negatively). Structure serves the role of facilitating purposeful and effective informal interaction
rather than prescribing the modes of interaction and decision-making.

b. Legitimacy grounded in efficacy
Proactive lawyering strives for efficacy—the ability to produce a desired or intended result, to
enable problem solving and the achievement of goals. The gaze is forward looking rather than
backward looking, and focused on impact rather than predictability.74 Problem solving is integral
to integral to proactive lawyering;75 it requires facilitating a process of understanding, specifying,
diagnosing, and seeking to achieve the desired state. 76 This role corresponds to Robert Cover’s
capacious definition of law as the relationship between the “is”, the “ought” and the “what might
be.”77
Proactive lawyering’s inquiry is exploratory rather than adjudicative: how can the lawyer
or decision maker facilitate the achievement of goals and the furtherance of purposes? What will
it take to effectuate the desired outcome? What actually will work to address the problem, rather
than what category or legal significance does this problem involve? 78 This mode of engagement
relies on creativity, innovation, imagination, and the strategic use of information to craft
effective solutions and resolutions that satisfy the participants and meet the demands of the
situation. 79 Power stems not from authority and the capacity to enlist coercion, but instead from
influence, persuasiveness, and demonstrated capacity to achieve desired outcomes.80
Globalization, technology, and complexity have amplified the importance of this focus on
efficacy.81

c. Collaboration

Simon, supra note XX, at .
Problem solving is the first skill identified in the MacCrate Report setting out key lawyering competencies.
MacCrate Report, supra note XX.
76 Paul Brest and Linda Hamilton Krieger, Lawyers as Problem Solvers, 72 TEMPLE L. REV. 811, 812 (1999).
77 Cover, supra note .
78 Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 754 (1984).
74
75

79MacCrate Report, supra note XX, at 152.
80 See IAN AYRES AND JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 110-116 (1992);
81 See KIMBERLY AUSTIN, ELIZABETH CHU, AND JAMES LIEBMAN, RE-ENVISIONING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

(2017). Available at
https://cprl.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/reenvisioning_professional_education_03142017_whit
e_paper_1.pdf, (last visited on August 15, 2019).
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Proactive lawyering prioritizes collaboration. Its success depends on enabling people
affected by, interested in, and responsible for an issue to work together, even across competing
interests and opposing positions.82 Processes like learning from failure, deliberation,
experimentation, design thinking, problem solving, and innovation get their power from bringing
diverse perspectives together to learn with and from each other. They call for engaging with
difference not as a way to evaluate the merits of each, but instead to enable effective learning
from peers, adversaries, and outsiders, and interacting that enables creative solutions and
effective implementation. Trust is a necessary lubricant of these interactions. 83

These three features of proactive lawyering described above form a logic that operates in tension
with that of legality. Legality’s dualities are summarized below:

Adjudicatory Lawyering

Proactive Lawyering

Formality

Informality

Authority

Efficacy

Adversarialism

Collaboration

II.

WHAT MAKES LAWYERING PARADOXICAL?

Law and lawyering call for both adjudicatory and proactive lawyering, as exhibited by
the previous section. Yet, these opposite modes of thought, interaction, and experience
sometimes operate at cross-purposes, and even contradict each other. These opposing mindsets

See Cohen, supra note XX; Heineman, Lee, and Wilkins, supra note, at 15 (“We need lawyers who are not just
strong individual contributors but who have the ability to work cooperatively and constructively in groups or on
teams that are increasingly diverse and multidisciplinary—and who can lead these teams effectively.”)
83 Amy Cohen’s description of juvenile and family courts identifies informality, conciliation, and anti-adversarialism
as characteristics enabling these courts to provide “social justice” in contrast to “legal justice.” provides an example
of the contrast between legality and proactive law and lawyering. Amy J. Cohen, Family, the Market, and ADR,
2011 J. DISP. RESOL 91, 100-101 (2011).
82
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and practices are nonetheless interdependent and mutually constitutive. In short, they are
paradoxical.
Although students and scholars alike have observed the tensions built into lawyering, 84
the significance of their paradoxical nature has been largely overlooked. A burgeoning literature
demonstrates that paradoxes operate as a particular form of duality that affect how those tensions
are experienced and whether they will undermine or facilitate the pursuit of both sides of the
duality.85 The paradox lens thus offers a conceptual tool for engaging productively with the
tensions between legality and proactive lawyering, paving the way for the practical strategies set
out in Parts III and IV.
Before exploring the five lawyering paradoxes built into lawyering, we need greater
clarity about paradox’s meaning.86 In the legal and scholarly literature about lawyering, the term
“paradox” is often used interchangeably with other terms conveying the idea of tensions and
oppositions.87 I am calling attention, however, to the importance of differentiating paradoxes
from dilemmas.88 A dilemma is a necessary choice between mutually exclusive alternatives, each
with advantages and disadvantages.89 Bernard Williams uses the example of a person who is
both lazy and thirsty, who is seated comfortably and the drinks are elsewhere. 90 Unlike a
dilemma, a paradox involves choices that are contradictory but interdependent rather than
mutually exclusive. Paradoxes cannot be resolved; the contradictory elements are built into the
situation. This self-referential and cycling quality is what constitutes a paradox.
Peter Elbow, a scholar of teaching and learning, an example illustrating the concept of
paradox in the context of teaching and learning: “students seldom learn well unless they give in

See, e.g., CULLEN, supra, PHILIP C. KISSAM, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW SCHOOLS (2003) (describing paradoxes in
legal education, identifying practices at cross-purposes, and holding out little hope for significant change);
DEBORAH RHODE, LAWYERS AS LEADERS 5 (2013); Larry Richard, Leadership Competencies in Law, in LAW AND
LEADERSHIP (2013).
85 See ELBOW, supra note ; Moshe Farjoun, Beyond Dualism: Stability and Change as a Duality. 35 Acad. Mgt.
Rev. (AMR) 202-225. (2010); LINDA HILL, COLLECTIVE GENIUS: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF LEADING INNOVATION
(2014); BARRY JOHNSON, POLARITY MANAGEMENT: IDENTIFYING AND MANAGING UNSOLVABLE PROBLEMS viii
(2014); Charles A. O’Reilly and Michael L. Tushman, Ambidexterity as a Dynamic Capability: Resolving The
Innovator’s Dilemma, 28 ORG. BEHAV. 185 (2008): SMITH AND BERG, supra note XX; Wendy K. Smith and
Marianne W. Lewis, Toward a Theory of Paradox: A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Organizing, 36 ACAD. OF
MGMT. REV. 381 (2011).
86 Scholars and commentators have sometimes used other language to described a similar phenomenon, including
“polarities”, JOHNSON, supra note , at viii; “dualities,” Farjoun, supra note , at 205; contraries, ELBOW, supra note
XX, at 3; and dialectics. Id. at 240.
87 See, e.g., RHODE, supra, note XX; MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW (1993); CUMMINGS, supra note XX.
88 Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/paradox (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).
89 Caroline Christof, The Possibility of Moral Paradox, 2 Polymath 40 (2012) (“[I]n a moral dilemma, a person is
forced to choose one obligation over another and to elect the best course of action.”).
90 Bernard A. Williams and W.F. Atkinson, Ethical Consistency, 39 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY
SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES 103, 104 (1965).
84
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or submit to teachers. Yet, they seldom learn well unless they resist or even reject their
teachers.”91
How people think about paradoxes actually affects how they experience them. Paradox
scholars have explored the dynamics of paradoxes as well as the behaviors that determine
whether paradox produces cycling back and forth between opposing alternatives—that is,
“stuckness” or constructive struggle. 92 One of the most influential sources on the meaning and
operation of paradoxes, written by Kenwyn Smith and David Berg, focuses on the paradoxes of
group life.93 Smith and Berg observe that groups become strong and resourceful only if the
individuality of their members is expressed.94 Individual expression, however, sparks group
conflict—that is, conflict capable of fostering novel understandings and disrupting group
decision-making and performance.95 Each method of disposing of the conflict gives rise to a new
set of tensions; the attempt to unravel these contradictory forces creates a circular process that is
paralyzing to groups.96
The first step in putting the paradox concept to work is to name the recurring paradoxes
facing lawyers, and what makes them both conflicting and interdependent--that is, paradoxical.
Drawing on the scholarly literature, teaching experience, and field research, I have identified five
lawyering paradoxes that stem from the opposing yet interdependent features of legalistic and
proactive lawyering: paradoxes of thought and discourse; relationship; motivation, mindset, and
justice.
A. Thought and Discourse Paradoxes: Methodological Skepticism v. Methodological
Possibility
The modes of thought characterizing legality as compared to proactive lawyering could
be thought of as two competing methodologies.97 Legality (or adjudicatory lawyering) employs a
methodology of skepticism, emphasizing critical thinking, logic, categorization, argumentation,
vigilance, detachment, evaluation, and judgment. 98 Proactive lawyering employs a methodology
ELBOW, supra note , at 65. This “authority paradox” has particular salience to lawyering, and is explored more
fully in Section, infra.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See Charles Sabel, Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a Volatile Economy." 46 HUMAN
RELATIONS 1133 (1993).
96 Id. at 14.
97 This discussion of competing methodologies is inspired by Elbow’s articulation of competing methodologies he
detected in the context of teaching and learning. He defines “methodological doubt as “the systematic, disciplined,
and conscious attempt to criticize everything no matter how compelling it might seem–to find flaws or
contradictions we might miss” and methodological belief as “the equally systematic, disciplined and conscious
attempt to believe everything no matter how unlikely or repellent it might seem—to find virtues and strengths we
might otherwise miss. Both derive their power from the very fact that they are methodological.” ELBOW, supra note
XX, at 257.
98 A methodology of skepticism thus prioritizes what Kahneman calls System 2 thinking: effort, sustained attention,
reasoning, and slow thinking required to “construct thought in an orderly series of steps” through criticism, caution,
making comparisons, planning, exercising choice and “checking the validity of a complex logical argument.”
KAHNEMAN, supra note , at 21, 22.
91
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of possibility, emphasizing creativity, intuition, seeing patterns, learning from difference,
innovation, empathy, experimentation, openness, and synthesis. 99 The methodologies of
skepticism and possibility thus pull in different directions in their thought processes, aims,
emotional valence, and role expectations.100
The forms of reasoning that are particularly concentrated in legality’s mode of argument
and decision making are logical, analytical, categorical, and backward looking.101 Legality
adopts a critical and skeptical stance in thought, discourse, and decision-making. As a popular
text on legal reasoning and writing observes:
Your documents will be read by judges and supervising lawyers who must make decisions
based on what you have written. They don’t read out of general curiosity. They are decisional
readers and need you to be a decisional writer . . . Your readers are skeptical by nature and
for good reason. Skepticism helps them make better decisions. Their job is to look for
weaknesses in your analysis. If they find any, your writing is not helpful to them, and they
will react negatively to it. But if your readers can’t find any weaknesses, they will rely on
you, respect you as a professional, and be grateful for your guidance.102
Legality requires careful thinkers who are “alert, intellectually active, less willing to be satisfied
with superficially attractive answers, and more skeptical about their intuitions”. 103 The discipline
of analysis and interpretation holds legal thinkers to institutionally authorized forms of reasoning
that respects institutional roles and rules. 104
Legality also explicitly invites—indeed, requires—judgment and evaluation.
Adjudicatory lawyering harnesses ceremonial contest—using dialogue to get ideas or
propositions to wrestle with one another so as to expose contradictions in what had been
assumed.105 It proceeds by placing conduct and people into categories and attaching judgment to
those categories. Legal inquiry determines fault. Decision-making involves isolating cause and
allocating responsibility to one side as opposed to another. It casts parties as opposing and invites
A methodology of possibility draws on what Kahneman calls System 1 thinking. Those characteristics include
generating impressions, feelings, and inclinations, suppresses doubt, cognitive ease, and associative thinking. Id. at
51-52.”
100 Duncan Kennedy’s pathbreaking work also informs this typology. Kennedy juxtaposes the hermeneutic of
suspicion vs. hermeneutic of restoration. Duncan Kennedy, A Social Psychological Interpretation of the
Hermeneutic of Suspicion in Contemporary Legal Thought 19; Duncan Kennedy, The Hermeneutic of Suspicion in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 25 L. AND CRITIQUE 91 (2014). For a discussion of the mechanisms that account for
the oppositional character of these modes of thought, see Kahneman, supra, BARBARA L. FREDRICKSON, POSITIVITY
(2009); TERESA AMABILE AND STEVEN KRAMER, THE PROGRESS PRINCIPLE: USING SMALL WINS TO IGNITE JOY,
ENGAGEMENT, AND CREATIVITY AT WORK 31 (2011).
101 See Section IA, supra.
102 RICHARD K. NEUMANN, ELLIE MARGOLIS, AND KATHRYN M. STANCHI, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING
(8th ed. 2017).
103 This mode of thinking corresponds to what Daniel Kahneman calls System 2 thinking. DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING FAST AND SLOW 46 (2011).
104 Michele DeStefano & Guenther Dobrauz, New Suits Appetite for Disruption in the Legal World (2019) available
at file:///Users/susansturm/Downloads/SSRN-id3411020.pdf.
105 This aspect of methodological skepticism is not unique to legal analysis, see ELBOW, supra note , at 262, but
conventional legal analysis privileges this mode of thought.
99
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each party to focus on the weaknesses of the other side’s position. It proceeds by narrowing the
areas of dispute and reaching a clear, singular, and unequivocal outcome. This mode of thought
undergirds legality’s relationship to rule-of-law values. It disciplines the exercise of power,
cabins discretion, and clothes legal decision-making with the imprimatur of principles over
personal biases.106
Rules, precedent, and authority serve to justify the use of force to back up legal
decisions.107 Robert Cover’s path-breaking work illuminated this relationship between violence
and law’s legitimation: “Beginning with broad interpretive categories such as ‘blame’ or
‘punishment,’ meaning is created for the event which justifies the judge to herself and to others
with respect to her role in the acts of violence.”108 Legality thus allows decision makers to justify
imposing decisions with serious consequences, including violence. 109
Proactive lawyering depends, in contrast, on contextual, forward looking and creative
thinking.110 This mode of thought is sometimes called lateral thinking; “moving beyond purely
linear, analytical thought; and shifting mental paradigms.”111 Proactive lawyering prizes
innovation, unlike legality, which privileges authority over efficacy. 112
Legality’s skepticism cuts against the more imaginative and improvisational form of
thinking integral to problem solving, brainstorming, and design thinking:
Though lawyers tend to make a sport out of shooting down ideas as quickly and
thoroughly as possible—whether it’s because ‘they’ve been tried before,’ an instinct says
that ‘it won’t work’, or otherwise. But the designer’s mindset pushes us to explore and
test ambitious ideas before trashing them . . . . We’ve been trained as lawyers to poke
holes and give critiques, but often that stops us from creating new things or supporting
others who are doing so.”113
Many of the texts used to develop proactive lawyering capacities discourage comparing,
categorizing, and assigning responsibility, all of which are integral to formal, authority-based
thinking.114 Design thinking, problem solving, and facilitating difficult conversations explicitly
See Section XX, supra.
See Section , supra.
108 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. (1986). Available at:
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol95/iss8/7
109 “Beginning with broad interpretive categories such as “blame” or “punishment,” meaning is created for the event
which justifies the judge to herself and to others with respect to her role in the acts of violence.” Cover, supra note
XX, at 7.
110 See Section IB, supra. Metaphor and narrative featuring prominently in the methodology of possibility. See
ELBOW, supra note XX; Menkel-Meadow, supra note XX.
111 Blasi, supra note XX, at .
112 Id.
113 Hagen, supra note , at http://www.lawbydesign.co/en/design-mindsets/.
114 This pattern surfaces in the literature on design thinking, see, e.g., MICHELE DESTEFANO, LEGAL UPHEAVAL
(2018); Margaret Hagen, Law By Design, available at http://www.lawbydesign.co/en/home/; Amanda PerryKessaris, Legal Design for Practice, Activism, Policy and Research, forthcoming J. L. & SOC’Y (Summer 2019),
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295671, empathetic listning, see, e.g., ; MARSHALL ROSENBERG,
106
107
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discourage the critical and backward-looking mode of thought that is the hallmark of legality.
Rather than assigning fault or responsibility, the modes of thought associated with proactive
lawyering promote mapping joint contributions,115 understanding root causes, and generating
multiple and even conflicting approaches to a problem. The goal of proactive lawyering goal is
to understand what actually happened so we can improve how we work together in the future.” 116
Predictability is not possible or even desired.117
Innovation has been identified as a crucial competency and practices by design thinkers,
experimentalists, and transactional lawyers. Proactive lawyering calls for expanding options,
understanding connections, intuition, and legal imagination, a form of thinking that enables its
practitioners to produce a more robust definition of the problem at hand, and a more plural
version of possible solutions. Legal imagination involves “the ability to generate the multiple
characterizations, multiple versions, multiple pathways, multiple solutions” to which students
then apply “very well honed analytic skills.” 118
This mode of thought contrasts with the requirements of legality. The literature explicitly
counsels the opposite approach of not judging, not blaming, not comparing or categorizing, and
not assigning responsibility. In Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most, a
book widely used in negotiations classes and in training lawyers, the authors designate the
“blame frame” as an error that will get in the way of handling a difficult conversation. Proving
we are right gets in the way of “understanding the perceptions, interpretations, and values of both
sides.”119 The goal is to move away from judging the truth of each party’s position, establishing
who is right and who is wrong, or allocating blame. Talking about fault “produces disagreement,
denial, and little learning. It evokes fears of punishment and insists on an either/or answer,” (the
essence of adversarial process). Blame and responsibility “distract us from exploring why things
went wrong and how we might correct them going forward.” Instead, the methodology of
possibility calls for systematic effort to see and experience the ideas of others as the speaker
does, to listen with appreciation. This mode of inquiry “forces us to enter into unfamiliar or
threatening ideas instead of just arguing against them without experiencing them or feeling their
force.”120
These differing modes of thought deploy different default modes of communication.
Legality proceeds through argumentation and advocacy. The form of communication also
NONVIOLENT COMMUNICATION (2015); interacting across difference, see e.g., CAROLYN GROSE AND MARGARET
JOHNSON, LAWYERS’ CLIENTS & NARRATIVE: A FRAMEWORK FOR LAW STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 56-62; and
having difficult conversations, see, e.g, DOUGLAS STONE, BRUCE PATTON, AND SHEILA HEEN , DIFFICULT
CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO DISCUSS WHAT MATTERS MOST (2010).
115 STONE, PATTON, AND HEEN, supra note , at 78-79.
116 Id. at 60.
117 TIM BROWN, CHANGE BY DESIGN 17 (2009).
118.Rakoff & Minow, supra note 1, at x.
119 Id. at 10.
120 ELBOW, supra note , at 263. This mode of thought asks, “not what are your arguments in support of a [silly]
belief,” but instead “Give me the vision in your head. You are having an experience I don’t have. Help me to have
it.” The emphasis is not on trying to construct or defend an argument but rather to transmit an experience, or enlarge
a vision. This mode of thought asks, “not what are your arguments in support of a [silly] belief,” but instead “Give
me the vision in your head. You are having an experience I don’t have. Help me to have it.” Id. at 261.
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reflects law’s formality. Dialogue within legal interactions has an instrumental purpose. It
produces the facts and law needed to advocate, persuade, and decide. Clients and witnesses—
those who directly experience the interactions giving rise to the facts—supply that information to
the formal actors who turn those experiences into facts that become the focus of analysis. The
focus of attention is on questions such as: What rule or principle applies to this situation? What
category does this situation fit into? How does this situation or actor compare to other situations
that have previously been decided? What are the problems with this argument? What have other
courts or authoritative sources previously decided and with what reasoning?
This mode of communication invites a specific kind of internal listening (referred to by
one prominent leadership reference as “level 1 listening”): “The spotlight is on the lawyer’s
thoughts and judgments, and conclusions. Listening serves to get the information needed to
decide how to use or act on what you learn.”121 The focus of awareness is on the relationship of
the facts to relevant legal categories. The thought process proceeds by comparing the situation at
hand to other situations to determine their legal significance. The purpose of this analysis is
evaluation and judgment. The structure, timing, and purpose of interactions flow from the aim of
evaluating and judging for the purposes of producing a decision. The personal stories underlying
the facts presented in legal decisions matter only in so far as they relate to the relevant legal
categories.122
For interactions aimed at having building a relationship, difficult conversations,
designing innovative solutions, or solving problems, however, “arguing may seem natural, even
reasonable. But it is not helpful. . . [It] “interferes with the ability to learn how the other person
sees the world.”123 In contrast, the practices of proactive lawyering invite “a move from certainty
to curiosity, from debate to exploration, from simplicity to complexity.”124 This stance of
curiosity is embraced in design thinking, conflict resolution, coaching, systems thinking, and
problem solving. The purpose of inquiry is understanding, integrating, and making sense of
differing perspectives. The focus is on understanding. Communication adopts a both/and, rather
than a yes/but stance. Even if you are convinced you are right, the conversation is not about
establishing who’s right. The focus is on working out a way to connect that will enable you to
move forward.
The methodology of possibility thus calls for a different kind of listening and inquiry.
The idea is not to categorize but instead to understand, learn, and see the possibility for two
stories that conflict and still coexist. Kinsey-House refers to this as level 2 (dialogue) and level 3
(global listening).125 Design thinking shares this focus on communicating to learn about and
engage intended beneficiaries: “to deliver to them something that will be useful and usable to
them, first you need to understand them. This means caring deeply about their needs, their values

KIMSEY-HOUSE et al, supra note, at 33.
MERTZ, supra, note, at 9 (“When handed a case to read, you now automatically check to see what the court did in
reaching its decision. Poignant, glaring, pitiful stories of human drama and misery begin to sail easily past you, as
you take them expertly in hand and dissect them for the “relevant” facts.”)
123 STONE, PATTON, AND HEEN, supra note, at 26, 29.
124 Id. at 37.
125 See KINSEY-HOUSE, supra note XX.
121
122
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and their behavior.”126 Rather than engaging in arguments and counter arguments, this approach
invites questions such as: “what’s interesting or helpful about the view? What are some of the
intriguing features that others might not have noticed? What would you notice if you believed
this view? If it were true? In what senses or under what conditions might this idea be true? 127
The aims of adjudicatory as compared to proactive modes of thought pull in different
directions. Legality aims to produce a single, certain right answer, a singularity of meaning that
will decide a particular conflict. Its aim is to narrow the scope of dispute, and settle on a single
answer that disposes of the conflict. Proactive lawyering, at least at some stage of the process,
generates multiple possibilities.128
The emotional valence associated with the methodology of skepticism (critique and
analysis) also conflicts with the emotions associated with methodology of possibility (creativity
and imagination). There is growing evidence that:
Good mood, intuition, creativity, gullibility, and increased reliance on System 1 form a
cluster. At the other pole, sadness, vigilance, suspicion, an analytic approach, and
increased effort also go together. A happy mood loosens the control of System 2 over
performance: when in a good mood, people become more intuitive and more creative but
also less vigilant and more prone to logical errors. Cognitive ease is both a cause and a
consequence of a pleasant feeling. 129
Recent research has revealed that emotions can have both positive and negative effects on a
range of work behaviors, including creativity, decision making, and negotiations. 130 For
example, positive feelings can lead to greater flexibility in problem solving and negotiations. 131
By contrast, negative emotions narrow and restrict the social and cognitive environment; at the
same time, they facilitate careful and unbiased judgment.132
Notwithstanding their tensions, these two modes of thought depend upon each other for
their successful realization, and even give rise to their opposite twin even as they resist that call.
Judgment and evaluation require the input of accurate and reliable information that can only be
obtained through forms of inquiry that do not prejudge or evaluate, and that employ empathy,
appreciate listening, and learning. 133 Clear rules and boundaries can, under certain conditions,
actually enable creativity. Linear and logical analysis alone cannot reach a resolution in
situations of ambiguity and competing values, at least if it is to proceed with integrity and

BROWN, supra note.
ELBOW, supra at 275.
128 Both use analogy, but for different and, in some respects, conflicting purposes.
129 ELBOW, supra note XX, at 69.
130 AMABILE KRAMER, supra note XX, at 31.
131 Barbara Fredrickson provides research associating positive emotions—such as joy, amusement and interest—
with broadening perspectives; they build social and intellectual resources. FREDRICKSON, supra note XX.
132 KAHNEMAN, supra note XX, at 69.
133 BINDER, BERGMAN, TREMBLAY, AND WEINSTEIN, supra note , at 1-4; MacCrate Report at 151-152.
126
127
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legitimacy. Critical legal theorists are joined by legal process adherents in noting the
interdependence of legality and purpose:
The demands of inner morality of the law are affirmative in nature: make the law known,
make it coherent and clear, see that your decisions as an official are guided by it etc. To
meet these demands human energy must be directed toward specific kinds of
achievement, and not merely warned away from harmful acts.” 134
Critical legal scholars, legal process scholars, and pragmatic lawyers alike have recognized the
necessity of generating (and then choosing between) multiple plausible ways of proceeding or
prioritizing of values, which in turn calls for the methodology of possibility, even as part of
adjudicatory decision making. Roberto Unger also shows how conventional legal analysis leads
to discovering the limits of that legal analysis and the dependence on more proactive and
imaginative modes of thought:
When we begin to explore ways of ensuring the practical conditions for the effective
enjoyment of rights, we discover at every turn that there are alternative plausible ways of
defining these conditions, and then of satisfying them once they have been defined. For
every such conception, there are different plausible strategies to fulfill the specified
conditions . . . . Thus, a method designed to vindicate conceptual unity and institutional
necessity revealed unimagined diversity and opportunity in established law. 135
The multiplicity of possibilities generates a need for resolution, either to enable progress toward
a goal or to resolve conflicts.
The paradoxical relationship also cuts in the opposite direction: the methodology of
possibility requires engagement with the methodology of skepticism to succeed. Negative
feedback and critique are crucial to learning and improvement, even as it discourages the
disclosures necessary to enable that critique to happen. Intuition and creativity are susceptible to
bias, which requires methodology of skepticism as a form of accountability. 136 Design thinking,
innovation, and problem solving require boundaries to enable creativity, as well as ways to deal
with conflict that cannot be resolved through dialogue. Researchers have documented the critical
role of boundaries, limits, and rules in setting the conditions that enable creativity. 137 Indeed,
design thinking makes explicit the need for both types of thinking by calling first for flaring–the
generation of ideas without critique and then for funneling–critical analysis of those ideas (even
as it generally fails to address the tensions between them). 138
Thought and discourse paradoxes are built into law at the level of the meaning, structure
and operation of law. Law operates through the simultaneous operation of practices and precepts
that create the possibility for creative and cooperative action, while also affording the vehicle for
LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 42 (1964).
UNGER, supra note, at 28-29, 42.
136 Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinsky & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1 2007-2008,
137 See O’Reilly and Tushman, supra note , at ; ELBOW, supra note XX; KAHNEMAN, supra note XX.
138 Hagen, supra note XX; Perry-Kessaris, supra note XX.
134
135
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preventing destructive conflict by imposing general norms backed by the force of the state. This
role contradiction has been identified both by jurists committed to legal decision making as the
basis for law’s legitimacy and by critical legal theorists who have located this contradiction in
legal rationality’s failure to acknowledge the ideological and institutional commitments
underlying conventional legal decision making. 139
Lawyers operating within conventional legal thought are called upon both to accept the
constraints of conventional legal analysis even when those constraints operate against problem
solving, while they are also called upon to find ways to solve the problems that bring clients to
them. As problems increase in complexity and the limits of rule-based solutions become more
evident, lawyers operating in both the public and private sectors occupy positions that call for
creativity alongside critique. 140
Thus, although conventional 1L curriculum and jurisprudence equate “thinking like a
lawyer” with the thought processes of legality, lawyering actually involves a broader and
sometimes conflicting array of thought processes that depend upon each other for their effective
operation.141

B. Relationship Paradoxes: Strategic vs. Trust-based
Legality and proactive lawyering promote different and sometimes conflicting practices
and assumptions related to building and conducting relationships. Within the framework of
legality, as rehearsed in the conventional law school classroom and the formal legal system,
formal roles define the contours and purpose of relationships. Students are invited to step into the
shoes of various legal personae, and the relationships they develop both in the class and with the
roles they play reflect the characters and settings defined by the “distinctively legal drama.”142
Relationships are instrumental, defined by formal roles and legal interests. Selves are conceived
and relevant characteristics defined by their relationship to the legal problem. Elizabeth Mertz
documents this pattern of identity formation in the first year classroom:
As people in the cases become parties (i.e. strategic actors on either side of the legal
argument), they are stripped of social position and specific context, located in geography
of legal discourse and authority. Their gender, race, class, occupational, and other
identities become secondary to their ability to argue that they have met various aspects of
legal texts. These contextual factors do sometimes become salient to the discussions, but
only as ammunition in just this way.143
See Kennedy, supra note XX; UNGER, supra note XX.
Raymond H Brescia, Creative Lawyering for Social Change, 35 Georgia State U.L. Rev. 529 (2019).
141 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal
Education? 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 103 (2001) (“The creative legal problem solver, then, must learn to
navigate within the seas of optimistic creativity, the swells of dynamic interaction with others (client and other
counsel and parties) and the oceans of realistic legal possibility.”)
142 MERTZ, supra note , at 97.
143 Id. at 131.
139
140

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477424

30

LAWYERING PARADOXES

25-Oct-19

Draft: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission
.
Classroom discourse “models a split between the selves with which [they] approach problems:
there is the personal opinion, which [they] hold in abeyance and over which they exercise
control, and there is the professional response, which is “agnostic” and whose primary goal is
honing the students’ discursive power.”144 Students are encouraged “to adopt a new, more
distanced attitude toward morality and emotion.” Their effectiveness turns on their ability to
strategize and make arguments, and to channel discomfort or emotion into “arguments”. 145
Relationships also have an instrumental character to them, defined by the purpose of the
interaction. Dialogue is both central and scripted, with the lawyer and the judge setting the terms,
flow, and areas of inquiry. Lawyer/client relationships (and currency of time for measuring
value) set clear boundaries on the form, purpose, and scope of interactions, both between the
lawyer and the client and among adversaries. Students learn to see and be able to argue both
sides of an argument, and to see the strengths and weaknesses of their own argument from the
perspective of the other side.
Legality’s ideal is “blind justice”—dispassionate application of rules to objectively
determined facts, with decisions governed by reason rather than politics or emotion. Legality
operates to maintain distance and minimize vulnerability and expression of emotion.146
Emotional distancing enables lawyers and judges to exercise their roles requiring them to witness
and even cause human pain, and thus both cope and escape responsibility:
The judicial conscience is an artful dodger and rightfully so. Before it will concede that a
case is one that presents a moral dilemma, it will hide in the nooks and crannies of the
professional ethics, run to the cave of role limits, seek the shelter of separation of
powers.147
Conflict is managed indirectly by intermediaries, with the emphasis on producing a result that is
favorable to the client or that warrants respect and adherence, rather than achieving
understanding or reshaping the nature of the relationship among the parties. Those with the direct
stake in the outcome of the legal context rely on representatives to speak on their behalf. Trust
and legitimacy come from fulfillment of role expectations, the ability to rely on the predictability
and accountability built into the formal relationship and transparency of the legal process. Within
the legal process, groups who lack power and access outside of the legal system have a formal
opportunity to interact and be heard. 148 Conflict is managed through ritualized processes and
representation, rather than by direct engagement of the stakeholders. Emotions are to be
managed rather than worked through. 149

Id. at 122.
Id. at 101.
146 Oliver Goodenough, Institutions, Emotions and Law: A Goldilocks Problem for Mechanism Design, 33
VERMONT L.R. 395 (2009).
147 ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 201 (1975).
148 Minow, supra note , at 1912.
149 See Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict between
Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509 (1994).
144
145
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Proactive lawyering, in contrast, prioritizes building relationships of trust that enable
people to work together, disclose sensitive information, share perspectives, and have difficult
conversations. The development of mutual trust is key to lawyers’ counseling and advising roles,
as well as to structuring productive interactions that can achieve mutual aims. 150 Mobilizing
people to achieve a common goal requires cultivating informal relationships in which people
seek to connect, engage openly with emotions and needs, develop empathy, and build trust. New
governance and negotiation “share methodological and normative commitments to purposive
human development, to an expansive imagination of human possibilities, to the idea that these
possibilities are expansive because human desires are dynamic and produced through social
interaction.151 Design thinking asks lawyers to develop mutual relationships where stakeholders
speak in the first person and share their interests and needs:
Being user-centered means Being Participatory, looping in stakeholders into your
process. You can have the people you’re working with join you in trying to create new
solutions. Rather than you playing the all-powerful expert who will solve their problems
for them, the participatory approach means deferring to your users and other experts at
key moments. The users’ voices should drive your work. 152
Effective collaboration calls for authenticity, connection, credibility, and empathy.153
Proactive lawyering treats emotion as a driver of self-awareness, creativity, inspiration, and
understanding. It calls for the willingness to take risks, which in turn both requires and builds
relational trust. This calls for engaging with your own emotions and those of others,
understanding your own and others needs, seeing how aspects of experience beyond reason and
rationality affect the way we think and act, and learning how to “have your feelings or they will
have you.”154
In contrast with legality’s de-emphasis on identity, client-centered lawyering encourages
embracing cultural differences rather than fearing for their impact.155 Proactive lawyering
generally highlights the role of developing empathy, which is a different kind of perspective
taking than seeing both sides of an argument. Empathy involves “shifting from how you seem on
the inside to my imagining of what it feels like to be you on the inside, wrapped in your skin,
with your set of experiences and background, and looking out from the world from your eyes.”156
Empathy operates alongside reflective practice as a crucial mode of inquiry and understanding
for proactive lawyers.157 Both enable lawyers to uncover ways in which their own views and
Charles Sabel, Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a Volatile Economy. 46 HUMAN
RELATIONS, 1133 (1992) (defining trust as “the mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will exploit the
other’s vulnerability”); Claire Hill and Erin O’Hara O’Connoll, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
150

1717 (2006).

Cohen, supra, note , at 517.
Hagen, supra note , at http://www.lawbydesign.co/en/design-mindsets/#criticism.
153 BILL GEORGE, PETER SIMS, ANDREW N. MCLEAN, AND DIANA MAYER, AUTHENTIC LEADERSHIP 4 (2018).
154 STONE, PATTON, AND HEEN, supra, at; ROSENBERG, ANDERSON AND ADAMS, supra; DEBORAH L. RHODE AND
AMANDA K. PACKEL, LEADERSHIP FOR LAWYERS 30 (2018); MNOOKIN, PEPPET, AND TULUMELLO, supra.
155 BINDER et al, supra note , at 6; GROSE AND JOHNSON, supra note XX, at 37-43 (2017).
156 STONE, PATTON, & HEEN, supra note, at 184.
157 GROSE AND JOHNSON, supra note , at ; MacCrate Report, supra note , at 66.
151
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assumptions color the kind of advice they offer, assess facts, and prioritize values. 158 “Emotion, a
potential barrier to problem solving, when carefully understood and revealed is vulnerable to a
set of strategies designed to enhance productive self-expression.”159 Value differences are
engaged directly and become the focus of negotiation and problem solving. 160
Collaboration and team building also call upon lawyers to building informal relationships
that enable trust building:161
Even in highly stressful situations such as litigation, [lawyers] develop a working
relationship whenever possible, including with their clients and even with opposing
counsel and parties. They take a collaborative, noncompetitive approach to many
situations, are good at listening and are open to new ideas. [They] gather vital
information through conversation, dialogue, questions, and interaction. They thoroughly
vet their ideas with their colleagues, learn from their adversaries, and collaborate
whenever possible. Through inquiry and collaboration, they develop their own emotional
insights and inspire the same awareness and capacities in their team members. 162
Proactive lawyering aims to build the capacity of stakeholders, parties, communities, and
organizations to organize, deliberate, work together, solve problems, and pursue common
goals.163 Collaboration and relationship building are also important to learning, staying engaged,
being able to work effectively in groups, and fulfilling group related functions successfully,
including those related to legality. 164 Technology, globalization, complexity, and market forces
are forcing private practitioners and public interest lawyers toward collaboration. 165
Adam Kahane, a prominent conflict resolution documents the conventional understanding of
collaboration to push adversarialism and conflict into the shadows, and to proceed as if “we can
problem-solve our way into the future.” He shows the paradoxical relationship between conflict
and collaboration—the risk of unconstrained engaging. “Conventional collaboration focuses on
engaging, and that does not make room for asserting, so it becomes ossified and brittle; it settles

GROSE AND JOHNSON, supra note , at 54-55 (discussing the importance of cross-cultural communication in
lawyering).
159 Cohen, supra note , at 525.
160 See, e.g., Michael Dort, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 NYU L. Rev. 875, 975 (2003)(practical
deliberation. . . can work around value differences, and in the long run, even change them.”).
161 Heidi Gardner, Effective Teamwork and Collaboration, in MANAGING TALENT FOR SUCCESS: TALENT
DEVELOPMENT IN LAW FIRMS: 145–159 (R. Normand-Hochman ed., 2013); Liebman et cl, supra note, at
162 ROBERT CULLEN, supra, note, at 11.
163 See, e.g. Michael Grinthal, Power With: Practice Models For Social Justice Lawyering, Charles Sabel, Beyond
Principal-Agent Governance: Experimentalist Organizations, Learning, and Accountability, quoted in Cohen, supra
note , at 528 (innovations “such as benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, continuous monitoring, error detection
and root cause analysis” make it possible to devolve decision making control to “civil society actors” in ways that
promote “social learning about the effective pursuit of the broad imprecise goals”).
164 DWECK, supra, Sturm and Guinier, supra, Edmunson, supra.
165 Gardner, supra note XX.
158
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into a stupor and gets stuck . . . If we embrace harmonious engagement and reject discordant
asserting, we will end up suffocating the social system we are working with.” 166
Legality and proactive lawyering thus promote opposite and, in some respects,
conflicting approaches to relationships. Elizabeth Mertz summarizes the double edge character of
this legal mediation of relationships:
On one hand, the approach to legal reading found in law school classrooms offers
students a potentially liberating opportunity to step into an impersonal, abstract, and
objective approach to human conflict. On the other hand, erasing (or marginalizing) many
of the concrete social and contextual features of these conflicts can direct attention away
from grounded moral understandings, which some critics believe are crucial to achieving
justice.
The tensions also work in the other direction. The distancing and detachment required by
formality and adversarialism undercuts the trust building and interpersonal responsibility that is
necessary to effective implementation of norms. 167 William Simon illustrates this dynamic in his
article on the impact of legalization on the welfare system:
While the formalization of AFDC rules and procedures “seem[s] to have reduced the
claimant’s experience of oppressive and punitive moralism, of invasion of privacy, and of
dependence on idiosyncratic personal favor …[it] also [has] reduced their experience of
trust and personal care and [has] increased their experience of bewilderment and
opacity.”168
Formality also hides from view “the contextual and human factors that influence how people
observe and interpret facts.”169
Robert Cover conveys the irresolvable tension between proactive lawyering’s organic norm
communities and the relationship underlying legality. Legality’s relationship to state power and
violence destroys the normative ties between judge and those before the court, as well as those
attached to the court’s power:170
As long as legal interpretation is constitutive of violent behavior as well as meaning, as long
as people are committed to using or resisting the social organization of violence in making

ADAM KAHANE, COLLABORATING WITH THE ENEMY: HOW TO WORK WITH PEOPLE YOU DON’T AGREE WITH OR
LIKE OR TRUST 55, 65 (2017).
167 Massaro, supra note ; Charles Sabel, Studied Trust, Tyler and Bies, Macaulay (1963), Scott, Sabel. Sim B. Sitkin
and Robert J. Bies, The Legalistic Organization: Definitions, Dimensions, and Dilemmas, 4 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
345 (1993).
168 Quoted in Massaro, supra note XX, at
169 Bartholet, supra note XX, at .
170 Cover, supra note ; Minow, supra note XX; KISSAM, supra note , at 96.
166
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their interpretations real, there will always be a tragic limit to the common meaning that can
be achieved.171
Yet, both types of relationships are necessary for effective lawyering; law students and
lawyers must learn to navigate this tension between relationships premised on strategic
interaction and relationships oriented around building trust. Adversaries who cannot cooperate
are less effective in making deals and settling cases.172 Effective learning in law school depends
upon being able both to operate in formal public settings and to build authentic relationships,
take the risk of being wrong, and ask for help when you need it. Lawyers cannot obtain the
information needed to build a case or design a deal without building a relationship of trust, which
requires building empathetic relationships with clients, with whom they also have a formal and
bounded professional relationship defined by instrumental aims. Litigation both invites mutual
cooperation to avoid the limitations of solutions derived through adversary process and creates
conditions that make cooperation difficult and even risky.173 Effective lawyering requires both
relationships of trust and the capacity to detach, assert positions, and fight when necessary. 174

C. Motivation Paradoxes: Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Motivation
Legality and proactive lawyering take contrary approaches to motivating behavior.
Within legality’s logic, the motivation for adhering to norms is basically extrinsic, in the form of
duty, incentives, threats, and coercion. 175 Legality takes a compliance orientation and ultimately
relies on force, or the power of the state to enforce norms and motivate behavior. Legal actors
achieve adherence through the imposition of legal requirements, the expression of legal duties to
comply with those responsibilities, threats of negative consequences for failing to adhere, and
when necessary, coercion.
Proactive lawyering, in contrast, emphasizes the importance of using persuasion,
learning, creation of shared purpose, inspiration, and participation as ways to motivate
behavioral change. These strategies deploy intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is “doing
work because it is interesting, enjoyable, satisfying, engaging, or personally challenging,” 176
while extrinsic motivation is the desire for a “separable outcome,” such as a reward or avoidance
of a penalty.177 Interpersonal commitments are characterized by reciprocal acknowledgment.
Proactive lawyering’s broader roles call for a different relationship to values and purpose, and

Cover, supra note (Violence and the Word), at 1629.
Gilson and Mnookin, supra note .
173 Id. at 521 (“In litigation, where even cooperative behavior occurs in the context of a competitive environment,
the risk of misunderstanding an opponent's move is significant.”)
174 KAHANE, supra note XX, at 31; Goldberg, supra note .
175 Extrinsic motivation is the grasp of what needs to be done and the drive to do it in order to get something else.
AMABILE, supra note , at 34
176 Id at 34.
177 Id.
171
172

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477424

35

LAWYERING PARADOXES

25-Oct-19

Draft: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission
.
highlights the importance of self-awareness, connecting to values, acting consistently with
purpose, practicing one’s values and principles.178
This tension between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations also plays out in the incentive
structures shaping law students’ and lawyers’ choices. Many law students came to law school out
of genuine and intrinsic interest in the law and a desire to advance deeply held public values and
positive social change, but experience the pull of extrinsic motivations (grades, prestige, money)
coming from law school and the legal profession. 179 A study of students at Yale Law School
documents this tension between prestige and purpose that many students experience when they
arrive at law school. 180 A similar tension operates in private practice as well. 181
The tension between intrinsic and extrinsic ways of motivating behavior is well
documented in legal, psychological, and economic literature. Scholars have shown that extrinsic
motivation in the form of punishment, threat, carrots, and sticks, can crowd out intrinsic
motivation, which is necessary for changes in behavior required for compliance with those
norms.182 “If extrinsic motivators are extremely strong and salient, they can undermine intrinsic
motivation: when this happens, creativity can suffer.”183 The reliance on extrinsic motivations
that coerce or induce compliance through threat of sanctions can undermine the acceptance of the
court’s legitimacy, the willingness to take risks and assume responsibility. 184
Katherine Bartlett summarized these tensions in an article analyzing the impact of law on
norm internalization related to implicit discrimination.185 On one hand, law provokes compliance
by “symbolizing a consensus” that may challenge people to think critically about and perhaps
revise their thoughts. It may reinforce a self-identity consistent with complying with the law, and
educate others on what it means to be a good person. On the other hand, coercion may provoke
resistance when people feel a law is unfair, or when it insults their sense of identity or autonomy.
Law may also be in a more fundamental tension with internal motivation: it may crowd out

Lee & Wilkins, supra, at ; MacCrate Report, supra note ; MNOOKIN, PEPPET, AND TULUMELLO, supra.
RHODE, supra note , at .
179 See John Bliss, From Idealists to Hired Guns? An Empirical Analysis of “Public Interest Drift in Law School;
Mertz, supra note; Sturm and Guinier, supra Pete Davis, Our Bicentennial Crisis, available at
http://hlrecord.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/OurBicentennialCrisis.pdf.
180 Susan Sturm and Kinga Makovi, Full Participation in the Yale Law Journal (2015), available at:
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/files/FullParticipationintheYaleLawJournal_otc6qdnr.pdf. See also sources cited at
note , supra.
181 See Scott L. Cummings, Introduction: What Good Are Lawyers?, in THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM:
LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 1-2 (Scott L. Cummings ed. 2011).
182 Kristin Underhill has provided a useful analysis of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations
Kristin Underhill, When Extrinsic Incentives Displace Intrinsic Motivation: Designing Legal Carrots and Sticks to
Confront the Challenge of Motivational Crowding-Out, 33 YALE J. REG. 213 (2016).
183 AMABILE, supra note XX, at 35.
184 The economic and psychological literature documents “how incentives may have counterintuitive and
counterproductive effects on human behavior.” Id. See also Ayres and Braithwaite, supra note XX, at 25.
185 Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation In Reducing Implicit
Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893 (2009)
178
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people’s sense of responsibility to do the right thing in the absence of a coercive rule backed by a
sanction.186
This analysis corresponds to the literature’s approach to motivating behavior. One text
aimed at promoting empathetic interaction puts it this way: “When we submit to doing
something solely for the purpose of avoiding punishment, our attention is distracted from the
value of the action itself. Instead, we are focused on the consequences of what might happen if
we fail to take that action.”187 This leads to “diminished goodwill on the part of those who
comply with our values out of a sense of either external or internal coercion.” 188
Robert Cover’s work places this tension between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in the
context of a fundamental and unavoidable tension built into the meaning and structure and
operation of law. Law works through the simultaneous operation of practices and precepts that
create the possibility for creative and cooperative action, while also affording the vehicle for
preventing destructive conflict by imposing general norms backed by the force of the state. This
produces an irreconcilable tension between law’s role in fostering and promoting creative and
organic norm communities (which generate conflict among those communities) and its role in
using violence to enforce order-preserving norms (which undercuts those norm communities). 189
Yet, this tension between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is built into the educational
enterprise (not only law school), lawyers’ roles, and the legal system. Although the prevailing
culture in many law schools skews that tension in favor of extrinsic motivations, adult
educational theory demonstrates the necessity of both investing in students’ growth and assessing
their performance.190 Likewise, part of law’s value lies in its simultaneous proximity to power
and its responsibility for enhancing value and values.

D. Mindset Paradoxes: Fixed vs. Growth Mindset
These differing constellations of thinking, communicating, and relating, combine to
produce competing mindsets with different and in ways competing orientations to conflict,
failure, and risk. Within the frame of legality, conflict serves to define issues that have to be
resolved, and to juxtapose competing views of the facts and law, thus presenting a third party
with the strongest articulation of each side. The conflict resolution process enables an impartial
and detached third party to decide which side wins the conflict. Conflict is a contest, with a
winner and loser. The role of the legal process is to reduce or resolve conflict. The judicial
Id. at 1937.
ROSENBERG, supra, at 188.
188 Id. At 15-16.
189 Cover, supra note XX, at (“The conclusion emanating from this state of affairs is simple and very disturbing:
there is a radical dichotomy between the social organization of law as power and the organization of law as
meaning.”).
190 See ELBOW, supra note XX, at . Bonita London, Geraldine Downey, and Shauna Mace, Psychological Theories
of Educational Engagement: A Multi-Method Approach to Studying Individual Engagement and Institutional
Change, 60 VAND. L. REV. 455 (2007).
186
187
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system (or its equivalent when mimicked in other settings) is justified as operating as a theater of
competition to displace and defuse violent conflict and increase the legitimacy of decision
making.191
Within the frame of proactive lawyering, conflict is a function of inevitable difference,
and a normal part of human interaction. The orientation to conflict is to find a way to understand
where it stems from, whether there are points of connection that would enable people to work
together in the face of that conflict. Conflict thus invites engagement, exploration of the
underlying source of the difference, and a way of acknowledging the feelings, needs, and
requests of each participant in the conflict.
Competing approaches to failure also exemplifies the tension between adjudicatory and
proactive logic. In the context of the adversary process, mistakes and failures matter in so far as
they cross a legal line and make that behavior susceptible to a finding of fault. Thus, fault and
mistakes are either a basis for entitlement to relief or for exposure to judgment. Failure means
losing. Thinking and analysis focuses on whether wrongful behavior occurred, if so whether it
could be adjudged unlawful. Mistakes are to be minimized or avoided because they cause
actionable harm or give rise to liabilities, or adjudged wrongful if they occur. For a law student,
making a mistake on a cold call in class means not “getting it”. 192
In the context of proactive lawyering, failure plays a very different role. Failure operates
as the driver of learning and growth. The important question is not whether the behavior violated
a norm, but rather, how can the relevant participants learn and change from the failures and
mistakes? The motto of design thinking is “fail early to succeed sooner.” 193 The process of
building effective teams and collaboration requires building conditions of psychological and
identity safety.194 The hallmark of psychological safety is being able to make mistakes without
fear that you will be labeled or judged as a result. The driver of improvement in new governance
is the identification of failures at the moment they occur by those closest to the problem.195
These different approaches to failure give rise to different orientations to risk, particularly
under conditions of uncertainty. Legality invites treating legal risk as something to be minimized
or avoided. It’s risky to ask questions when you don’t know the answer or to act in the face of
legal uncertainty. Playing it safe means not taking actions that could invite litigation or
judgment. In contrast, proactive lawyering treats risk as a necessary part of learning, growth, and
innovation.196

See Edelman, supra note XX,
Sturm and Guinier, supra note XX.
193 TIM BROWN, CHANGE BY DESIGN: HOW DESIGN THINKING TRANSFORMS ORGANIZATIONS AND INSPIRES
INNOVATION 4 (2009).
194 Amy C. Edmunson, Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q., 350 (1999)
Valerie Purdy-Vaughns, Claude Steele, C. M., Davies, P. G., Ditlmann, R., & Crosby, J. R. Social Identity
Contingencies: How Diversity Cues Signal Threat or Safety for African Americans in Mainstream Institutions. 94 J.
PERSONALITY AND SOC.PSYCH. 615 (2008).
195 Simon, supra note XX, at 47.
196 See DESTEFANO, supra note .
191
192

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477424

38

LAWYERING PARADOXES

25-Oct-19

Draft: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission
.
Legality and proactive lawyering have diametrically opposing reactions to uncertainty.
Legality treats uncertainty as something to be reduced and managed, and its unavoidability
produces pessimism about law’s capacity to address the issue. Proactive lawyering (such as
experimentalism, design thinking, deal making, and negotiations) takes a contrary view:
This incompleteness of facts, circumstances, priorities, and normative benchmarks is not
necessarily a challenge to overcome or even a source of conceptual trouble. To the
contrary, it provides the basis for great optimism. It is precisely because interests and
priorities are multiple and shifting rather than fixed and known to parties in advance of
dialogue, that there are vast opportunities for individuals to innovate, collaborate, and
solve very hard problems.197
Legality’s approach to failure, risk, and conflict coalesce into a mindset or orientation
that corresponds what Carol Dweck has called a fixed mindset. 198 A fixed mindset equates
success and failure with people’s abilities, which are fixed. Success or failure defines who you
are. Law’s focus invites a fixed mindset by putting people in categories based on their past
behavior and assigning meaning to that person based on those categories. Failure is equated with
being wrong (or at least being found wrong), and thus with losing. Failure is therefore something
to be avoided.
Individuals with a fixed mindset emphasize compliance, control, and satisfying
expectations—all of which form an important (and desired) part of law school and legality.
Martin Seligman has noted the zero-sum character of adversary process as a root of the mindset
paradox:
One of the triggers for combating demoralization involves the avoidance of zero-sum
situations. In law, such situations seem inevitable; they lie at the heart of our adversarial
system of justice. If we accept that the adversary model embraces important social
values, displacing it may not be in our interest. If so, some degree of lawyer unhappiness
may be unavoidable if we are to achieve societal goals. This raises the ironic possibility
that lawyers can be made happier only at public expense.199
Studies have associated law students with a pessimistic explanatory style: “a tendency to
interpret the causes of negative events in stable, global and internal ways: “It's going to last
forever; it's going to undermine everything; it's my own fault”. Under this definition, the
pessimist will view bad events as unchangeable. The optimist, in contrast, sees setbacks as
temporary.”200
Proactive lawyering both demands and cultivates a growth mindset. Design thinking,
experimentalism, mediation and negotiation, and problem-solving courts all emphasize the
importance of learning and growth, the role of failure as a driver of growth and change, and the
Cohen, supra note XX.
DWECK, supra note XX, at 6. See KATHRYN M. YOUNG, HOW TO BE SORT OF HAPPY IN LAW SCHOOL 109
(2018).
199 Seligman, supra note XX.
200 Rosen, supra note XX.
197
198
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importance of creating environments and relationships that enable people to take risks, try out
new ideas, and share what they don’t know.
As Ben Heineman has noted, success and thriving in both law school and the legal
profession actually requires both mindsets:
We need lawyers who, in making recommendations or decisions, are capable of assessing
all dimensions of risk but who are not risk-averse. Taking well-considered chances is not
a quality of mind customarily associated with lawyers but is often vital to innovation and
change in the public and private sectors. 201
A growth mindset also enables law students to navigate the inevitable stresses and setbacks that
students experience while they learn to “think like a lawyer.”
Yet, laws’ connection to judgment necessitates operating within the fixed mindset. When
learning and growth fails to produce a resolution, law and lawyers step in to impose one, using
processes premised on a fixed mindset. That aspect of lawyering fulfills a core function of the
rule of law, as well as a paradoxical relationship with proactive lawyering’s call for imagination,
creativity, and learning from failure.

E. Justice Paradoxes: Formal vs. Substantive Justice
Finally, legality and proactive lawyering deploy conflicting yet intertwined conceptions
of justice. There are three aspects to the justice paradox, all of which connect to legality’s
relationship to power. The first stems from legality’s reliance on the instruments of the state as
the way to advance justice. Legality works within state-baked legal processes to advance norms.
The legitimacy of law’s operation and lawyers’ roles derives from their operation within a
system that disciplines the exercise of power. Formality, authority, and adversarialism occupy a
central place in the narrative of law’s claim to justice, at least as an indispensable means of
pursuing substantive justice.202 As Unger has described this characteristic of legality:
A system of rules is formal insofar as it allows its . . . interpreters to justify their
decisions by reference to the rules themselves and to the presence or absence of facts
stated by the rules . . . Everything will depend on where one draws the line between the
factors of decision that are intrinsic to the system, and therefore worthy of consideration,
and those that are not.203
Law thus operates as self-referential system. It cannot promise substantive justice “in a
community whose members disagree with one another about what substantive justice amounts

HEINEMAN, LEE, AND WILKINS, at 15.
Waldron, supra note XX, at 117.
203 R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 204 (1976).
201
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to.” In imposing formal justice, it will necessarily collide with and destroy the norms of a
subgroup whose values conflict with those upheld through legality. 204
Those instruments of legality are themselves unjust in significant ways, which leads to
the second aspect of the justice paradox. Substantive injustice is baked into the legal system
itself. Those injustices inhere in the origins of constitution upholding slavery, the rules set up so
that the “haves come out ahead,” and the starkly unequal access to justice pervading our legal
system. The methodology of legality is itself not neutral. Legal realists, critical theorists, critical
race theorists, and feminist scholars have identified this contradiction between formal justice and
justice as lived experience in the world as it actually operates. 205
Methods shape substance also through the hidden biases they contain. The method of
distinguishing law from considerations of policy, likewise, reinforces existing power
structures and masks exclusions or perspectives ignored by that law . . . A strong view of
precedent in legal method, for example, protects the status quo over the interests of those
seeking recognition of new rights.”206
This contradiction exemplifies “the internal instability characteristic of programmatic positions
in contemporary law and politics: the conflict between the commitment to defining ideals and the
acquiescence in the arrangements that frustrate the realization of those ideals or impoverish their
meaning.”207 The challenge, then, is to figure out “how to maintain a normative commitment to
the rule of law when we can foresee that this commitment will everywhere be betrayed by the
actions of the very positive legal institutions charged with implementing the rule of law.208
Although the crisis of legitimacy in the Trump era is recent, the paradox is at least as old
as the Constitution. Robert Cover documented the tension between positive and moral justice
faced by judges charged with enforcing the law of slavery. 209 Martin Luther King powerfully
communicated this dual character of law’s justice in the Letter from the City of Birmingham
Jail.210 King explicit called “paradoxical” that a group that so diligently urges obedience to the
laws outlawing segregation would consciously break the law. He proclaimed the injustice of a
formal laws that “degrade human personality:”

Robert Post identified the inevitability of normative contradictions “because political action in modernity always
aims at the creation of institutions, and institutions must function according to the rule of law if they are to act fairly
and effectively.” Robert Post, Leadership in Law Schools, AALS SECTION NEWSLETTER, (2019), available at
https://sectiononleadership.org/2019/03/08/leadership-in-law-schools/ .
205 Amna A. Akbar in Toward a Radical Imagination of Law describes “a central dilemma of liberal law reform
projects, caught between a commitment to the rule of law and status quo arrangements on the one hand, and the
desire for substantive justice and social, economic, and political transformation on the other.”
206 Bartlett, supra note at 845
207 UNGER supra at 129.
208 Robert Post, Leadership in Law Schools, AALS SECTION NEWSLETTER, (2019), available at
https://sectiononleadership.org/2019/03/08/leadership-in-law-schools/ .
209 COVER, supra note .
210 Martin Luther King, Letter from City of Birmingham Jail (1963), available at
https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.
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An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority
group to obey but does not make binding on itself. This is difference made legal. By the
same token, a just law is a code that a majority compels a minority to follow and that it is
willing to follow itself. This is sameness made legal.
The judicialization of rights has the potential both to inscribe inequality into law and “to amplify
conflict and focus attention on it,” and to “transform physical conflict into verbal disputes” and
“give public voice and force to people previously ignored, to make conflict audible and
unavoidable.”211
Yet, these two conceptions of justice are inextricably linked, even as they are
contradictory. King also depicted the dual edge character of formal law’s relationship to
substantive justice:
[L]aw and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and that when they fail in
this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social
progress. . .Like a boil that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be
opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be
exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and
the air of national opinion before it can be cured. 212
King sought justice in both senses of the word. It is only by stepping outside of law to shine a
light on law’s injustice that the law can claim both to be justice and to advance justice. To
advance justice in the world requires stepping outside of legality and as currently defined by law
and legal institutions, both to pursue justice outside law and to move legal institutions closer to a
sense of justice as it is actually experienced.
The third dimension of the justice paradox relates to the contradiction between law as a
system of values and law as a value proposition.213 The profession operates as both, and law
schools similarly embody this tension between purpose and prestige. Here too, the relationship
turns out to be paradoxical. Law’s appeal—to future lawyers, clients, and change agents—
resides in part in its proximity to power and resources; yet that relationship invites cooptation
and acquiescence in the status quo at the expense of one’s fulfillment.

F. The Interdependence of Adjudicatory and Proactive Lawyering
Thus, legality and proactive lawyering operate in tension with each other, sometimes to
the point of directly contradicting or displacing one another. The contradictory elements of
legalization and adaptive leadership are built into the definition and operation of law. One
element demands and gives rise to the other. A person cannot effectively practice legality
Minow, supra note XX, at 1873, 1881.
Martin Luther King, Letter from City of Birmingham Jail (1963), available at
https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.
213 Cummings, supra note XX; Samuel Moyne, Law Schools Are Bad For Democracy, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED.,
(2018), available at https://www.chronicle.com/article/Law-Schools-Are-Bad-for/245334.
211
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without also engaging the practices associated with proactive lawyering, but the practices of
legality conflict in significant ways with those required for adaptive leadership. This selfreferential and cycling quality is what makes lawyering paradoxical. The contradictory options
are interrelated such that the tension will inevitably resurface. 214
How law students and lawyers manage these contradictions will make a big difference to
their effectiveness as lawyers, their fulfillment, and their connection to advancing justice. The
next section explores the limits of conventional approaches to navigate this tension.

III.

T HE PERILS OF PARADOX A VOIDANCE

The ability to thrive in law school and in the legal profession—and to pursue lawyers’
responsibility to advance justice—turns in no small measure on how students and lawyers fare in
navigating the lawyering paradoxes described in the previous section. Yet for the most part,
students are left to their own devices to understand and manage these tensions. Law schools
generally pay little attention to this paradoxical dynamic, its impact on law students, or its
implications for responding to the clarion call for change. Notwithstanding the growing focus on
proactive lawyering, many students and lawyers continue find themselves buffeted by the
demands of legality and proactive lawyering.
The question for legal education and the legal profession is whether these lawyering
paradoxes will be experienced as counter-productive—producing vicious cycles,
disengagement, and dysfunction—or dynamic—fueling learning, transformation, and the
capacity to navigate complexity. That difference depends at least in part on how individuals,
contexts, and cultures construct the relationship between legality and proactive lawyering.
Since attending law school, I have been observing how legal academics, law students,
and the legal profession (including myself in each of these roles) navigate the tensions between
legality and proactive lawyering. I have been tracking the strategies and the impact informally,
by observing how students experience law school, and more systematically by examining
scholarship about legal education, conducting qualitative research about law students and
lawyers, and analyzing students’ blog posts about their law school experience. 215
The three approaches to the tensions between legality and proactive lawyering
resemble common approaches to paradox; they try to escape, resolve, or sidestep the
lawyering paradoxes identified in the previous section. Research on lawyering seen through
the lens of the paradox literature suggests that, though these strategies are understandable,
Smith and Lewis, supra note, at 387.
See Sturm and Makovi, supra note ; Sturm & Guinier, supra note ; Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier, Learning from
Conflict: Reflections on Teaching About Race and Gender, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 515 (2003); From Gladiators to
Problem Solvers, supra note XX. I have also coded the blog posts from Lawyering for Change, and identified
patterns emerging from those posts. In both Lawyer Leadership and Lawyering for Change, students post blogs on a
weekly basis, inviting reflection about their experience of law and law school, along with their developing theories
of change.
214
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they are counter-productive as ways to equip lawyers and the law to engage in both
adjudicatory and proactive lawyering. None work to reconcile the lawyering paradoxes, or to
address the ways that these logics compete and sometimes undermine each other’s effectiveness.
Paradoxes cannot be avoided or resolved, although they can be managed. They involve a
“struggle of opposites, with each method of disposing of the conflict giving rise to a new set
of tensions.” 216 When the situation fails to “hold” these contradictions and works instead to
deny, avoid, or resolve them, or to have them carried by a subset of the community, then “ the
preconditions for ‘stuckness’ are created. 217 They give rise to counterproductive dynamics that
breed cynicism, polarization, disengagement, and dysfunction. 218
This section discusses three problematic approaches to lawyering paradoxes: (a)
crowding out modes of thought in tension with legality, (b) inviting premature or problematic
resolution of ambivalence and contradictions, and (c) contributing to cynicism about law’s
relationship to justice.

A. Crowding out proactive lawyering
Problems emerge when legality (like one side of any paradox) “tries to hog the whole
bed.” Although clinical legal education and experiential learning opportunities have
increased, 220 the culture and currency of many law schools remains focused on mastering
legality. 221 In many law schools, the formative first year focuses almost exclusively on
learning legality. Adjudication remains the default mode of inquiry and practice, and court
decisions form the backbone of many upper level classes. Most casebooks proceed within
the logic of legality. For many law students, most of their courses emphasize doctrinal
analysis. Legality’s modes of thought, motivations, and discourse often dictate how students
learn the law even in courses focused on non-adjudicatory settings, such as legislation and
transactional lawyering. 222 Non-adjudicatory modes of thought and practice are referred to
as “alternative dispute resolution.” Learning to “think like a lawyer” prototypically refers to
conventional legal reasoning in adjudicatory settings. 223 The default mode of assessment in
law school (and on the bar exam) prioritizes issue spotting, legal reasoning, and legal
writing.224 Many law schools grade on a curve, which heightens students’ competitiveness
219

Id.
SMITH AND BERG, supra note, at 15.
218 Id. at 208.
219 ELBOW, supra note , at 258.
220 See Section IV, infra.
221 The McCrate report, based on a systematic study of legal education, observed that, many law schools prioritize
legal reasoning skills, and fail to devote attention to proactive lawyering. See MacCrate Report, supra note XX.
222 Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136
U. PA. L REV. 1564, 1569-71 (1988); Howard Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain of Sand: The World of Law and Lawyers
as Portrayed in the Clinical Teaching Implicit in the Law School Curriculum, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1157 n.10 (1990).
223 Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 313, 325 (1995).
224 Id.
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and preoccupation with performance over learning. 225 Researchers have also documented
the lasting impact of this equation of lawyering with legality on how people think about
themselves as lawyers. 226
Law schools’ focus on legality at legal education’s defining moments affects the way
many law students and lawyers think and feel about the competencies and practices related to
proactive lawyering.227 Legality’s emphasis on the methodology of skepticism reinforces the
general tendency to value critical thought over creativity and imagination. 228 This tendency—to
remember negatives over positives, to value criticism over appreciative inquiry, to listen with an
ear toward refuting rather than understanding—exists in any discipline defined by critical and
logical thinking.229 Many students infer from the pervasiveness of methodological skepticism,
particularly in the first year when they are forming their identities as lawyers, the idea that other
modes of thinking do not count as part of thinking like a lawyer. 230 Conventional legal reasoning
treats politics, emotion, and intuition as a departure from logical and rational inquiry, which
threatens the legitimacy of legal decision-making.231
Methodological skepticism becomes self-referential—“the mirror through which it judges
what it is like;” it negates the value of what cannot be understood through that logic. 232 The
emphasis on “thinking like a lawyer” (narrowly defined) leads many students to devalue or
marginalize modes of thought that fall outside legality. Many students report experiencing a
dampening of their engagement with creative or imaginative thinking and practice. One student
in lawyering for change reported:
Coming into law school, I was really interested in trying to be creative in my approach
the law and took an expansive view of lawyering; however, I actually arrived in the law
school environment, that expansive view quickly narrowed down to accepting what
people told me about law school and being a lawyer and just keeping my head down and
getting my work done.233

See London, supra note XX.
Id.; MERTZ, supra note XX; UNGER, supra note XX.
227 Rakoff and Minow, supra note, (“The template for legal thinking established in the first year of law school has
real staying power”). Sturm & Guinier, supra note , at 96 (“The structure of courses in the first semester . . .
conveys the impression that appellate litigation and corporate practice constitute law’s core, and that law emerges
when judicial actors interpret the arguments of lawyers, the policies of legislators, or the decision of
administrators.”)
228 See PHILIP C. KISSAM, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW SCHOOLS: THE MAKING OF MODERN LAWYERS 6-7; Sturm and
Guinier, id.
229 Elbow, supra note .
230 Lesnick, supra note , at 1159.
231 KISSAM, supra note
232 See SMITH AND BERG, supra note , at 49-50.
233 Claire MacLanahan.
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Another noted that “I am rewarded for how well I can extract rule of law from cases and apply it
to a new set of facts. So, after last semester's exams, I have devoted more energy just practicing
technical method of rule → facts → application.234
This self-referential pattern can lead students (and faculty) to downplay or abandon
creative, non-linear modes of thought, even when they had experience prior to law school with
these methodologies.235 For some this led them to doubt the relevance of abilities that enabled
them to succeed prior to law school, many of which fall under the umbrella of proactive
lawyering. Some students interpret learning to think like a lawyer to mean setting aside or
unlearning other modes of thought, as part of becoming a lawyer.
I find it interesting just how much this mode of processing seeps into everything we do.
In many ways, it causes problems we become unused to solving, since the roles we are
thrown into often call for forward thinking, innovative solutions but our practiced mode
of analysis is backward looking and self-contained.236
The methodology of skepticism, with its focus on adjudication and its essentially critical
stance, thus tends to crowd out the imaginative, forward looking methodologies associated with
proactive lawyering.237 “The greatest imaginative cost of the canonical style of legal reasoning is
negative: it fills up the imaginative space in which another way of thinking might take root, and
it does so in the crucial testing ground on which authoritative ideals meet practical realities.” 238
Students and researchers also report a shift in the way students listen to each other. They
describe themselves as more likely to listen instrumentally and with the relevant legal categories
in mind, which draws them away from “the norms and conventions that many members of our
society, including future clients, use to solve conflicts and moral dilemmas.” 239 This
decontextualization encourages students to treat people as characters in a legal drama. They
listen for how they can use or refute what they are hearing, and report finding it more difficult to
listen with the goal of understanding, empathizing, or appreciating the perspective and
experience of others. They also are more likely to speak to demonstrate their proficiency, prove
their point, or win an argument. Researchers have documented—and many students reported—
reluctance to ask questions solely out of curiosity or to take the risk of appearing uncertain or,
even worse, not understanding.
Research conducted on practicing lawyers shows that the mindset and methodology of
competition and skepticism invited by legality coalesces into a culture and way of being for
Seofin Park.
One law student observed: The “softer” leadership skills that I have been learning and building for the past few
years working, but also prior to that in undergrad, seem less relevant for law school success. (The fact that my first
inclination was to refer to leadership skills as "soft" even though we have learned about concrete methods and
processes to improve our leadership capacity exemplifies the ways in which this paradox is playing out in my
education.)” CB.
236 K.J. [insert name], [insert title of blog post], Lawyer Leadership Course Blog (Insert date)..
237 Id. One advice book, based on interviews and surveys of law students, exhorts law studets to understand that
“you are being trained as a technician, not an innovator.” YOUNG, supra note XX, at 32.
238 UNGER, supra note , at 106.
239 MERTZ, supra note , at 99.
234
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many lawyers. Although there is evidence of a “lawyer personality” that is “distinguished by an
ethic of justice rather than an ethic of care,” predisposed to be skeptical, or to see the glass as
half empty rather than half full,240 there is also evidence that these tendencies are engendered at
least in part by legal education, 241 as well as by the prevailing legal culture in which one
practices.242
Students in Lawyer Leadership and Lawyering for Change have commented extensively
on the significance of the mindset they associate with law and law school for their learning and
role definition. They describe coming in with an orientation of exploration, learning, and risk
taking, and confronting experiences in and out of the classroom that undercut their orientation
toward growth and learning from failure. This fosters a tendency to avoid asking questions if
they are uncertain or confused, and to treat performance in law school, and particularly failure, as
defining of their ability. This pattern tracks findings of more systematic empirical studies of law
student experience.243
The predominance of legality’s mindset, motivations, and relationships thus cultivates a
collective fixed mindset—a marked departure from how many law students describe their
mindset as undergraduates or in pre-law school employment. Research also documents that that
women, people of color, and first generation students may experience this dynamic with
particular intensity.244
The choice to prioritize legality over proactive lawyering—clearest in the first year of
law school—carries over to how many students experience themselves throughout law school
and their legal careers. There is evidence that crowding out proactive lawyering may play a
contributing role in the widespread dissatisfaction and unhappiness that many law students and
lawyers experience. 245 How many times have you heard a practitioner say, “I am a recovering
lawyer,” as if lawyering were a disease? Or describe having left the practice of law, when they
continue to play roles that fall squarely under the umbrella of proactive lawyering? In an article
Larry Richard, Herding Cats: The Lawyer Personality Revealed, 29 Legal Mgt 1 (2002). It is worth noting that
Richard’s findings are based on studies primarily of partners in large private firms and corporate law departments.
241 See Lawrence S. Krieger and Kennon M. Sheldon, What Makes Lawyers Happy? A Data-Driven Prescription to
Redefining Professional Success, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 554 (2015); Robert Eli Rosen, Christine E. Parker, and
Viveke Lehmann Nielson, The Framing Effects of Professionalism: Is There a Lawyer Cast of Mind? Lessons from
Compliance Programs, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 297 (2012).
242 See Gilson and Mnookin, supra note , at
243 Bonita London, Geraldine Downey, and Shauna Mace, Psychological Theories of Educational Engagement: A
Multi-Method Approach to Studying Individual Engagement and Institutional Change, 60 VAND. L. REV. 455
(2007).
244 See Lani Guinier and Michelle Fine, BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE (1997); London, Downey, and Mace, supra note , at ; Elena Rodriguez, Student Thriving at Columbia Law
School: An Asset-Based Study of Climate for Student Engagement and Support (2016)(unpublished paper); Sturm,
supra note .
245 See Martin E.P. Seligman, Paul R. Verkuil, and Terry H. Kang, Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. (2001); Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence Krieger, Does Legal Education Have Undermining Effects on Law
Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, 22 BEHAV SCI & L. 261 (2004); Patrick J.
Schlitz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy and Unethical Profession, 52
VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999).
240

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477424

47

LAWYERING PARADOXES

25-Oct-19

Draft: Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission
.
written in 1990, Howard Lesnick summarized the impact of the partial quality of the truth
reflected by legality and the pyramiding of its mutually reinforcing assertions:
Taken as a whole, they systematically discourage students (and faculty as well) from
inquiring into unspoken premises, whether about the legal system, the larger social order,
or the role of lawyers; they inhibit the experience of choice, of human responsibility for
the social constructs that we call the law and the legal profession; they are—among other,
perhaps more serious vices—profoundly anti-intellectual.246
By “hogging the bed,” legality crowds out the practice and legitimacy of proactive
lawyering, shapes the choices students make about their courses and careers, and leads people to
pathologize lawyering. It leads some law students to disengage from law school and leave the
law when they conclude that the most important aspects of themselves are not part of being a
lawyer.247

B. Inviting premature or problematic resolution of ambivalence and contradictions
The prevailing strategy for introducing proactive lawyering to law schools that have
prioritized legality could be called “add and stir.” Many law schools now supplement their core
curriculum with a menu of discrete offerings that provide students with the opportunity to learn
various proactive lawyering skills and practices, usually starting in the second year. Proactive
lawyering competencies such as negotiation, listening, problem solving, collaboration, and
persuasive communication receive attention in a variety of courses ranging from alternative
dispute resolution to human rights, to problem solving and transactional lawyering, alongside
legal clinics. In the last twenty years, law schools have increased offerings such as clinics,
externships, human rights programs, alternative dispute resolution, problem solving, and
transactional lawyering. Some law schools have introduced required courses that expose law
students to proactive lawyering practices and methodologies. Design thinking has entered the
law school space and is an increasing focus of pedagogical and scholarly attention. Law schools
have recently shown interest in leadership learning, which emphasizes many of the competencies
required for proactive lawyering. 248
This approach of supplementing legality with proactive lawyering resembles what paradox
scholars call “splitting.”249 This strategy assigns responsibility for a less valued activity to a
separate and lower status domain. Proactive lawyering pedagogy often occurs in distinct realms,
apart from mainstream law school offerings focused on legality and with little opportunity to
Lesnick, supra note , at 1182.
See Schiltz, supra note XX. The ABA has recently recognized the urgency of addressing the issue of lawyers’
wellbeing. See National Task Force on Lawyer Well-Being, The Path to Lawyer Well-Being: Practicel
Recommenations for Positive Change (August 2017), available at
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/ThePathToLawyerWellBeingReportRevFINAL.pdf
(last visited August 16, 2019).
248 See note XX, supra. .
249 Smith and Berg, supra note XX, at 68.
246
247
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integrate these experiences. Different people occupy the spaces focused on legality and proactive
lawyering—often with different status, physical locations, and communities of practice. These
two modes of thought and practice remain largely separate, often with non-lawyers, specialized
clinical faculty, adjunct faculty, or administrators focusing on cultivating proactive lawyering
skills, while faculty teaching the mainstream conventional law classes maintain their pedagogy
oriented around teaching and critiquing legality. This approach of assigning separate spheres for
legality and proactive lawyering also occurs in practice groups and judicial systems. 250
For many students, courses emphasizing proactive lawyering comprise a small part of their
overall law school experience. As of August 2014, the American Bar Association requires law
students to take 6 credits of experiential learning as part of their course of study, out of a total of
84 credits required for graduation—7 percent of their total education. 251 Although some law
professors have begun experimenting with integrating forms of proactive lawyering into
conventional pedagogy, many non-clinical faculty members continue to organize their courses
around casebooks that prioritize learning legal reasoning and parsing appellate decisions as the
primary text for learning the law.”252
Problems arise from segregating, overlooking or underappreciating the tensions between
proactive lawyering and the powerful pull of legality. The siloed and lower status nature of
proactive lawyering makes it difficult for students to experience proactive lawyering as a
coherent methodology with its own rigor and practices extending beyond a particular course or
content area. Students struggle to make sense of the conflicting medium and messages promoted
in different quarters of the legal academy and the profession. The tension and ambivalence
produced by the lawyering paradoxes pervade the law school experience (and carry over into
practice).253 Unless they are addressed directly, these paradoxes are likely to invite familiar (and
counter- productive) patterns to escape the ambiguity, discomfort and uncertainty that
accompany living in the tension. 254
Faculty might unwittingly contribute to this counter-productive cycling, by introducing
methodologies of possibility alongside legality, without making explicit the assumptions and
practices of either, discussing the impact of one on the other, or equipping students to navigate
the contradictions they experience. They might teach the competencies associated with proactive
lawyering without relating them to law or lawyering. Design thinking, mediation,
experimentalism, or entrepreneurship may proceed legality as problematic or irrelevant, and fail
to engage with legality’s continuing role (like it or not).

See Gardner, supra note XX.
American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Revised Standards for
Approval of Law Schools, Standard § 303(a)(3)(Aug. 2014), available at
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/20182019ABAStandardsforApprovalofLawSchools/2018-2019-aba-standards-chapter3.pdf.
252 HEINEMAN, LEE, AND WILKINS, supra note XX.
253 See, e.g., Cummings, supra note ; Carla Messikomer, Ambivalence, Contradiction, and Ambiguity: The Everyday
Ethics of Defense Litigators, 67 . 739 (1998); Note, The Paradox of Prosecution, 142 HARV. L. REV. 748 (2018).
254 See Kahane, supra note; SMITH AND LEWIS, supra note XX.
250
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For example, business school courses sometimes proceed in the law school with the same
materials and pedagogy used in business schools. Business school cases used in law schools
were developed for the corporate setting, and do not address the situations lawyers face, or how
proactive lawyering practices relate to conventional lawyering roles. Design thinking instructs
students to cooperate and to place critique aside, often without accounting for tensions and
barriers erected by methodological skepticism. 255 Materials used in law school classes (including
my own) to cultivate leadership and build the capacity for difficult conversations contain blanket
critique of evaluation, comparisons, and judgment, without situating those critiques in lawyers’
responsibility for engaging in these practices as part of their roles. They may shy away from
grappling with how proactive lawyering will be affected by its adjudicatory twin or denigrate
the skills that legality requires.”256
Students may try to split their experience, by moving back and forth between the more
conventional law school activities and those that emphasize proactive lawyering. Some can
navigate this seesaw between proactive lawyering and legality without losing one or the other.
Research and experience show, however, that many students are deeply ambivalent about the
law, their relationship to it, and the pathway to their success and striving. Law school does little
to provide them with the tools to sustain their ambivalence, which is itself both painful and
difficult to sustain. Many studies document students’ ambivalent relationship to power,
adversarialism, prestige, and social justice. 257 Students report feeling torn by the competing
pressures and mixed messages they experience in law school. In the absence of strategies and
supports enabling them to live with and make sense of these contradictions, the ambivalent group
is inclined choose one over the other, often before they are ready to make such a decision.
Evidence suggests that this rush to resolution happens quite early in students law school career.
Scholarly work, including my own, exhibits this same tendency to sidestep the paradoxical
relationship between legality and proactive lawyering. They have proposed hybrids or substitutes
for conventional legality, without adequately addressing the ongoing tension between
adjudicatory and proactive lawyering built into the court’s role as an intermediary and lawyers’
involvement in intermediation. My work on second generation discrimination, for example,
simply cast the court in the role of catalyst and problem solver, without addressing how legality’s
approach to motivation and justice might limit courts’ capacity to serve as an effective
intermediary. After acknowledging critics’ worries about cosmetic compliance and cooptation,258
I downplayed the prevalence of these problems without confronting their roots in paradox, much
less strategizing about how to navigate those dualities.259
Other new governance scholars have shared this tendency to overlook or underappreciate
how legality’s methodology will continue to affect the way new forms of problem solving

SEE MARGARET HAGAN, DESIGN THINKING AND LAW: A PERFECT MATCH, THE INNOVATION ISSUE, JANUARY 2014.\
ROSENBERG, supra at .
257 See Bliss, Guinier, Fine, and Bailin, supra note ; Lesnick, supra note ; Mertz, supra note passim; Sturm and
Makovi, supra note , at
258 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1
(2006); Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO STATE L. J. 323 (2009).
259 See Sturm, supra note XX.
255
256
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unfold.260 By assuming that the processes themselves will take care of this, the new governance
scholars (myself included) fail to deal with the predictable ways that power differentials and
differences in capacity or willingness to engage will undermine new governance regime’s
effective operation.261 In retrospect, I see that some new governance critics also underappreciated
the paradoxical nature of law, leading them sometimes to advocate one side of the paradox over
the other, or to misread or stylize my efforts to create a hybrid approach. 262
In Violence and the Word, Robert Cover warned of the dangers of downplaying or
overlooking the impact of legality’s relationship to violence on law’s effort to generate norm
communities. That tension to some degree is inescapable. Robert Cover expresses these
contradictions in their most stark form, observing that, “pain and death destroy the world that
“interpretation” calls up. 263 “Judges kill the diverse legal traditions that compete with the
State.”264 By failing to attend to the lawyering paradoxes, law schools similarly squelch capacity
to navigate ambiguity and stay connected to what they care about.

C. Critique detached from transformative possibilities: Contributing to cynicism about law’s
relationship to justice
Many faculty and students alike are well aware of many of these limitations built into the
conventional lawyering. Critical analysis of case law happens regularly in mainstream law
school classrooms. “Thinking like a lawyer” includes learning to identify the flaws in courts’
reasoning, weighing competing policy considerations, and understanding the limits of courts as a
way of addressing complex problems lacking clear solutions. Indeed, this form of critique is part
and parcel of effective doctrinal teaching. 265 These include critiques of the reasoning or results
of particular court decisions or more crosscutting critiques of legality’s operation, drawing on
legal realism, critical legal studies, critical race theory, feminist theory, interdisciplinary studies,
and experimentalism.
Many faculty expose the contradictions between law and justice, but do not equip
students or the legal system to build an affirmative way of grappling with them. Often, this
critical lens identifies the limits of legality, but does not incorporate proactive lawyering
methodologies and mindsets into the overall pedagogy and practice. Critique remains within the
mindset and method of critique and argumentation, without inviting or equipping students to

See, e.g., Sabel and Simon, supra note XX; Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2003).
261 As Amy Cohen noted, “A collaborative social project that aims to challenge extant power hierarchies by
enhancing the capacities of stakeholders to act on their own behalf may evade a critical assessment of the ways in
which negotiations skills and strategies (and the interests they produce) are already inflected with the effects of
inequality. Cohen, supra note , at 543-544 (negotiations meet new governance).
262 Bagenstos, supra note XX; NeJaime, supra note XX (reading the move to include more collaborative forms of
interaction as inconsistent with and thus a rejection of lawyers’ more adversarial roles)).
263 Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1602 (1986).
264 Cover, supra note XX, at 40-44.
265 Post, supra at .
260
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view their lawyering roles to include advancing values and developing innovative and effective
solutions.266 As one student in Lawyering for Change noted:
During orientation, law students are urged to never let go of their values, to use their
education to go forth and make change they want to see, etc. But these values are by no
means reflected in our classes, though to be fair I do think that almost all my professors
do a really good job of pushing all of us to be critical of the systems we study. The main
issue is that the type of thinking essential to leadership values aren't really the ones that
are fostered or tested in class, and I don't really even know how that would look. 267
Students report that they lack venues and opportunities for processing their doubts and
ambivalence. In many law schools, the mainstream curriculum does not systematically focus on
the non-judicial forms and venues that lawyers occupy and that law engages. Nor has legal
education generally structured the curriculum to afford students opportunities to reflect on their
own. We have not yet developed the rigorous methodologies of possibility into our thinking and
teaching. The relentless press of work, combined with the pressure to project competence,
discourages students from engaging in much needed reflection about the contradictions they
face. Some of this is a function of the court-centeredness of so much of legal education.
So, faced with glaring disconnects between law and justice, students are left to their own
devices to figure out what to do with those critiques. When students experience this critique
without also engaging what can be done about it, students become cynical about the law and its
relationship to justice. This leads some to disengage from law school and from the possibility of
achieving justice through law. Students anguish about the disconnect between their values and
the law, between legal definitions of justice and justice as it is experienced in the world (as did I
when I was in law school).
If students lack regular opportunities to engage with other and with faculty about these
emotions and concerns, and to grapple seriously with ways to have positive impact in the face of
legality’s limitations, the paradoxes turn into frustration, discouragement, and for some,
disengagement.
We all seem to feel similarly that the law degree has the potential to empower us to make
meaningful change and also forces us into a rigid system with a specialized skillset that
makes it feel more difficult to make these changes. I sometimes wonder if we just have to
accept that we're going into a very structured world or if accepting that just makes us
more complicit/unmotivated to actually make these changes. 268
As Duncan Kennedy noted in his pathbreaking critique, first year law students have no way to
think about law “in a way that will allow one to enter into it, to criticize without utterly rejecting
it, and to manipulate it without self-abandonment to their system of thinking and doing.” Students
are immediately told that “their success or failure largely turns on swiftly learning to use the new
See Kennedy, supra note ; KISSAM, supra note ; UNGAR, supra note ; MERTZ, supra note XX; Post, supra note
XX.
267 S.K. [insert name], [insert tiltle of blog post], Lawyer Leadership Course Blog (Insert date)].
268 J.L.[insert name], [insert tiltle of blog post], Lawyer Leadership Course Blog (Insert date.)
266
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language,” leaving no time to find the political substance of the rules they are studying. This can
lead to cynicism about the law, and giving up on the law as a way to advance justice.
For non-believers in law’s neutrality, which includes many law students, the cognitive
dissonance between legal doctrine and their sense of fairness, their politics, and their values leads
them to question law’s legitimacy, to become cynical about law’s relationship to justice, and for
some, to disengage. However, as the next section explores, the paradox literature offers a way to
move forward in way that treats these contradictions as a source of creative friction, rather than
as a self-defeating cycle.

IV.

EMBRACING LAWYERING PARADOXES

This journey through the lens of paradox shifts attention toward figuring out how legal
education and legal practice can foster creative tension between legality and proactive lawyering,
rather than have one polarity crowd out, confuse, or undermine the other. Is there a way to equip
law students and lawyers to hold that tension? Can individuals and systems simultaneously learn
and practice the critical, categorical, formal, and judgment-based logic of legality and the
creative, improvisational, relationship building logic of proactive lawyering? Are there ways to
facilitate students’ and faculty’s engagement with lawyers’ roles as catalysts for justice and
facilitators of democracy when the institutions and politics demonstrably thwart those values?
There is much at stake in the way law schools and the legal profession takes up this
challenge. Many both inside and outside the academy and the legal profession have expressed
deep concern about law’s legitimacy: whether we will can have legal and political institutions
that will uphold the rule of law, advance justice, and work to revitalize a polarized and unjust
democracy. Law students will have to assume responsibility for these challenges, and law
schools bear the responsibility for equipping them to do so. They cannot succeed without
learning to navigate paradox.
This section shares what I have learned from my decades of study and struggle. The
Article draws on the insights gleaned from paradox scholars, as well from the “positive deviants”
among us in law schools. Positive deviants are the outliers who, working with the same resources
as everyone else, have been successful in addressing a tough problem where most others have
failed.269
There is much to be learned from the positive deviants who have been experimenting
with a third way to approach the tension between legality and proactive lawyering. Because of
their focus on integrating theory and practice, clinical faculty have been actively grappling with
these challenges for decades, usually in their separate spaces. Some non-clinical faculty have
figured out ways to incorporate proactive lawyering into teaching conventional subjects like
contracts, civil procedure, and corporations. Some students come into law school with
RICHARD PASCALE, JERRY STERNIN, AND MONIQUE STERNIN, THE POWER OF POSITIVE DEVIANCE: HOW
UNLIKELY INNOVATORS SOLVE THE WORLD’S TOUGHEST PROBLEMS 3 (2010).
269
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experience navigating these kinds of tensions or with a strongly developed sense of purpose and
a community to keep them grounded. Those that did were more likely to report that they could
set these practices aside and focus on legality without shifting their overall mindset and practice.
A few law schools have from their inception been organized to integrate legality and proactive
lawyering into students’ learning from the beginning of their law school experience. 270
Most have done this through experiments within a classroom, program, or project. Some
law schools are experimenting with more institutionally rooted experiments, and a few more law
schools have recently undertaken to build this dynamic tension into their mission. Many of these
innovators are proceeding in isolation, without connecting in any systematic way to others who
have undertaken innovation. Most have not recognized the value in naming and engaging
explicitly with the paradoxical nature of their practice.
A crucial move enabling these positive outliers to navigate paradox entails re-centering
the focus from law to lawyering. Even when legal strictures tether conflicts to legality, lawyering
have much a much wider range of motion. They can move back and forth between the spaces
employing legality and proactive lawyering, and invent new locations and institutions that link
back to those more constrained by history and structure. This shift from law to lawyering also
enables law students and legal practitioners to define “thinking like a lawyer” to include the
methodologies and practices of both legality and proactive lawyering, and to reconceive law to
include norms and forms of accountability generated through participatory practice.271
Lawyering can bridge these paradoxes by creating provisional, experimental projects and spaces
that link these contradictions and, where possible, transform both sides of the paradoxical
relationship. By framing students’ learning in terms of lawyering, the possibilities for navigating
paradox become real and actionable.
Drawing on the paradox literature, my experience in teaching and action research, and the
practices of positive deviants, this Section offers three strategies for forging dynamic tension
between legality and proactive lawyering: (1) holding paradox by observing, understanding, and
building awareness and acceptance of their operation; (2) building capacities that enable people,
groups, and systems to hold paradox, and (3) designing and organizing experiments, spaces, and
practices to facilitate and, in some instances, to transcend paradox.

A. Holding Paradox: Naming, Observing, and Understanding Paradoxes
One of the most surprising and encouraging insights from the paradox literature involves
the power of simply seeing the conflicting aspects of lawyering through the lens of paradox.
Research suggests that seeing those tensions as paradoxes actually changes how we experience
CUNY Law School is widely acknowledged as a curricular innovator that has from its inception undertaken to
integrate theory and practice, focuses on the relationship between law and lawyering, and engages students regularly
in reflection about the tensions and value choices facing lawyers. See Barbara Bezdek, Charles Halperin, Howard
Lesnick. A review of its core pedagogy and philosophy suggests that the school creates the context and capacities to
wrestle directly with the tensions between legality and proactive lawyering.
271 Lesnick, supra note ; Sturm, supra note XX.
270
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them.272 This shift in meaning enables a move from trying to resolve a dilemma that may not be
resolvable to sitting with observed contradictions, accepting that they coexist, trying to
understand how they operate, and inquiring about whether we can resolve them or must instead
learn how to work through them. “‘Working through’ does not imply eliminating or resolving
paradox, but constructing a more workable certainty that enables change.’’ 273 This shift occurs
by creating opportunities for noticing, observing, and accepting the paradoxical relationship
between legality and proactive lawyering when that duality surfaces, with specific attention to
the opposing yet interdependent practices and mindsets called for by each and the potential links
between them. The idea is to foster actors’ active awareness of the duality by noticing a paradox
without attempting to resolve or resist it, but instead observing it in practice. This reframing
move serves to enable people to sit with the conflict, and learn their way into the process of
maintaining both.
Peter Elbow provides some insight into why “searching for contradiction and affirming
both sides can allow you to find both the limitations of the system in which you are working and
a way to break out of it.”274 Using Chaucer as an illustration, Elbow notes that by “setting up a
polar opposition and affirming both sides,” we “lay the framework for a broader frame of
reference, ensuring that neither side can ‘win.’” The seeming dilemma can be arranged “so that
we can only be satisfied by taking the larger view.” 275
For example, one study observed successful chamber music groups built the capacity to
name and accept the paradoxical relationship between their need to individuate and express
autonomy as a musician, on the one hand, and the need to blend, cooperate, and come together
around a shared musical idea, on the other.276 Researchers learned that members of successful
string quartets came to understand the upside and the downside of either pole. Acceptance helps
members avoid unresolvable debates that sparked vicious cycles breeding distrust, and enabling
them to “play through” paradox by recommitting to shared overarching goals, expecting each
other to express contradictory needs, and focusing on their intense tasks. This framework might
help researchers address what tensions exist, why they may fuel reinforcing cycles, and how
actors may manage paradoxes to foster change and understanding.
This section first provides readers with some conceptual tools developed by scholars and
practitioners to help notice and understand paradox, and then shares some lessons learned from
efforts to introduce paradox to teaching and scholarship.

1. Conceptual tools for holding paradox

See ELBOW, supra note , at 240; Farjoun, supra note , at 203; SMITH AND BERG, supra note , at 259-265.
Luscher and Lewis, Organizational Change and Managerial Sensemaking: Working Through Paradox, 51
ACAD. MGT. J. 221, 234. (2008).
274 Id. at 243.
275 Smith and Berg, supra note; Smith and Lewis, Hall,
276 Murnighan and Conlon, supra.
272
273
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The paradox literature (both scholarly and popular) offers some useful tools for moving
back and forth between two opposing yet related concepts. Concrete illustrations of the process
of shifting perspective offer one such tool. For example, Barry Johnson explores the image
below as a way of helping us alternate “figure” and “ground” to see two conflicting images
embedded in a single image, which cannot actually be observed at the same time.

Is the picture above a goblet or two faces? The answer is both, depending on what you identify
as foreground vs. background. Johnson offers the practice of shifting back and forth, as well as
the concept of breathing in and out, to show that you cannot see from both perspectives at the
same moment but you can shift your gaze back and forth to experience both. He also
differentiates accuracy from completeness as a helpful way to understand paradox, as well as the
dynamics that contribute to vicious cycling. 277 The “faces or goblet” exercise exemplifies how
metaphor offers a way into paradoxical thinking:
What is most important about metaphor is that there must be a contradiction—a bit of
non-sense—before you can have a metaphor. . . The metaphor does not provide a new
system or synthesis, it only provides an abutting of opposing elements. Thus, metaphor
can be described a refusal to synthesize, an insistence on letting the contradiction stand:
simply to live with the contradiction and try to let it reverberate as a way of doing justice
to the complexity of its subject.278
The literature also offers some conceptual tools to help in seeing and holding paradox.
One tool is a Vent diagram, which is a diagram of the overlap of two statements that appear to be
true and appear to be contradictory, with the overlapping middle purposely left undefined:

Legality

277
278

Proactive
Lawyering

JOHNSON, supra note , at 21, 43.
ELBOW, supra note , at 250
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Venting is used in two senses: as “an emotional release, an outlet for our anger, frustration,
despair”, and as a vent that “enables stale, suffocating air to flow out, it allows new fresh air to
cycle in and through.”279 By styling these tensions as unlabeled vent diagrams, we get to “a)
actively confront binary thinking and b) imagine what’s actually in the overlap every time we see
and feel the vent.” Making vent diagrams “helps us recognize and reckon with contradictions and
keep imagining and acting from the intersections and overlaps.”280 They concretely illustrate the
value of creating a third space or vantage point, not occupied by either pole of the paradox, from
which you can observe the operation of both.
Another tool, offered by Barry Johnson, is a Polarity Map, which identifies the upside
and the downside of each pole, and provides a guide for moving through the quadrants to
maximize creative tension and minimize resistance: 281

L+ Positive outcomes from
focusing on legality

R+ Positive outcomes from
focusing on proactive lawyering

L- Negative outcomes from
focusing on legality

R- Negative outcomes from
focusing on proactive lawyering

Cutting across all these tools is a focus on reflection. Ronald Heifetz offers the idea of
“going to the balcony,” which involves imagining that you are simultaneously on a dance floor
and observing yourself and other on the dance floor from a balcony perched some distance
above. “Achieving a “balcony perspective” means “taking yourself out of the dance, even if only
for a moment,” returning to the dance floor, and then moving back and forth from the balcony to
the dance floor, with the goal of coming as close as possible to being in both places at the same
time. 282 Ellen Schall invites people to “learn to love the swamp”—moving back and forth
between the solid ground of legality and the mucky yet potent swamp where adaptive problems
reside, and to use reflective practice as the vehicle enabling that process. Reflective practice
involves “learning-in the midst of rapidly changing and constantly challenging situations-to be
self-aware, to understand oneself personally and in role; to be conscious of the impact of the self
on others, and others on self; to develop a ‘theory of action’ in a particular situation that is
testable and adjustable; and finally, to build theory from across one's own practice, theory that is
generalizable and available for testing by others.”283

Vent Digrams, available at https://www.ventdiagrams.com/vision-and-values. I am indebted to sujatha baliga for
introducing me (along with my Lawyering for Change class) to Vent Diagrams.
280 Id.
281 JOHNSON, supra note , at 4-5.
282 Ronald Heifetz and Marty Linksy, Get on the Balcony, in LEADERSHIP ON THE LINE 51-55 (2002).
283 Ellen Schall, Learning to Love the Swamp: Reshaping Education for Public Service, 14 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS AND
MGT., 202, 204 (1995)
279
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Although they do not necessarily use the language of paradox, legal scholars of different
stripes have offered various conceptual tools that help in paying attention to when paradoxes
arise and what impact they have. 284 Robert Scott identifies “the paradox of context which lies at
the heart of the binary choice between the desert and the swamp. . . Without context, no legal
rule can be applied, but with nothing but context no legal rule can be found.” 285 Mari Matsuda
offers the concept of multiple consciousness as jurisprudential method—the ability to work
within a particular viewpoint and then “shift out it for purposes of critique, analysis, and
strategy” as well as to “search for the pathway to a just world.”286 Roberto Unger proposes that
we identify the shaping influence of fundamental institutions and beliefs while also
acknowledging the replaceable and ramshackle, although often resilient character of these
formative contexts.” 287 Robert Mnookin identifies three tensions inherent in negotiation, noting
that the problem-solving negotiator cannot make these disappear. The first step in the process of
learning to managing these tensions is to pay attention to when they arise and what impact they
have.288

2. Lessons from the field
The power of simply noticing paradox resonates with my own observation and
experience in my teaching and research. In Lawyer Leadership, students have concretely
demonstrated the impact of simply offering the framework of paradox as a way to understand the
relationship between legality and leadership. In their reflections and an anonymous survey, many
students described the paradox frame for lawyer leadership as paradigm-shifting in their selfconception, their choice to pursue law, and their path to success and thriving as lawyers. 289 These
students had been stuck in a dilemma about how to choose between prestige and purpose,
lawyering and social justice, cooperative and adversarial roles, and professional identity and
personal growth. The idea of holding both shifted the questions they asked themselves, enhanced
the quality of their reflections, and gave them tools to choose how they think, relate to classmates
and material, and express emotions and needs.
I have also experimented with heightening awareness of the paradoxical relationship
between legality and proactive lawyering in mainstream law classes. In Civil Procedure, for
example, I now keep an eye out for situations where formal legal doctrine or practice implicates
MNOOKIN et al, supra note , at 9. See also Cohen, supra note ; Kahane, supra note.. See also Grinthal, supra note
, at 41. See also Bartholet, supra note, at .
285 Scott, supra note , at 1646-47.
286 Mari Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN’S
RTS, L. REP. 7, 9 (1989). See also Kathryn Barthlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 851
(1990)(advocating for practical reasoning, which “approaches problems not as dichotomized conflicts but as
dilemmas” which “do not call for the choice of one principle over another, but rather “imaginative integrations and
reconciliations,” which require attention to particular context”).
287 UNGER, supra note, at 23.
288 MNOOKIN et al, supra note , at 9. See also Cohen, supra note ; Kahane, supra note.. See also Grinthal, supra note
, at 41. See also Bartholet, supra note, at .
289 See, e.g., blog posts of Students A, B, C, and D.
284
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proactive lawyering practices, mindsets, and relationships. I have introduced the idea of paradox
at the points where cooperation and competition have to operate simultaneously, 290 or where
there is a tension between students’ sense of justice and the law’s definition of justice. These
opportunities actually permeate even the most conventional civil procedure class. When these
contradictions arise, rather than simply bracketing them and moving on (as I have done in the
past), I invite the students to identify the multiple and conflicting meaning of due process, the
requirements to collaborate and mediate before parties can call upon the court to sanction an
opposing party. I provide opportunities in and out of class for students to reflect about the roles
they might occupy, and what kinds of questions might they ask or relationships might they build
in each of those roles.
That exercise gives rise to questions that push students to identify and grapple with the
paradoxes: How might those roles and modes of thought conflict? How might you manage that
conflict? What challenges might you face? Where in your legal education will you have the
opportunity to focus more deeply on the critical proactive lawyering skills? When justice defined
by the courts starkly contradicts students’ (and often the judge’s stated) conception of justice, the
paradox idea has also helped give students a way be both inside and outside conventional legal
analysis. We can explore, even if superficially, what other venues, roles, and practices might be
part of an effort to advance substantive as well as formal justice, provide a space for students to
draw on their prior experience, and concretely identify when and where students can learn in
greater depth about proactive lawyering.. This strategy enables students to see early on that
thinking like a lawyer actually involves multiple ways of thinking, including mastering
traditional legal reasoning as well as connecting it to other ways of thinking, even when the
primary focus of the class is on legality.
My effort to introduce paradox in the classroom has been informed by the innovative
teaching practice of my colleague, Elizabeth Emens. Professor Emens teaches Contracts, and
Law, Justice, and Reflective Practice, along with co-teaching Lawyer Leadership. She uses a
variety of teaching tools to enable students to hold onto their sense of purpose and commitment
to advancing justice, even as they learn to think and speak like lawyers in the more conventional
sense of the word. Professor Emens has developed a variety of innovative techniques for holding
these contradictions in the classroom, including: requiring students keep an intellectual journal,
reflecting regularly about the relationship between the normative understandings of the court and
their own normative understandings, understanding the nature students’ objections and how they
would communicate them most effectively, and using various mindfulness strategies (sometimes
without naming them as such) to increase awareness and create space for values and emotion. 291
I have also seen how the concept of paradox can be a helpful framework for rethinking
legal, regulatory, and institutional design. For example, the paradox framework has helped me
rethink some of my earlier work, much of which was framed around resolving dilemmas or
These situations happen throughout civil legal process, and are built into the federal rules. See, e.g., F.R.C.P. 16,
26, 37 & 68.
291 Professor Emens is writing an article called “To Speak Like a Lawyer: Voice, Engagement, and Reflection in
Legal Pedagogy,” which lays out the themes and strategies she uses to equip them to hold the contradictions built in
to legal practice, and to
290
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finding both/and solutions to problems that were not amenable to resolution through judicial
fiat.292 My work sought to avoid the limits of legal process as a means of addressing second
generation discrimination or similarly complex problems by using a deliberative, problemsolving process to generate the legal norms that would be enforced by the court. Subsequent
work showed that the conflicts and tensions between formal legal process and adaptive
leadership process remained, and frequently led scholars to characterize the work as advancing
one prong of the duality at the expense of the other. The paradox frame now trains my attention
on how, when, and where to maintain both.293
There is thus value in identifying paradox as a conceptual frame, and cultivating dialogue
among people experiencing different aspects of the duality. This can be done both in spaces
understood to be grounded in methodological skepticism and those grounded in methodological
possibility.

B. Building the Capacity to Navigate Paradoxical Concepts and Practices
Although recognizing lawyering paradoxes when they arise constitutes an important first
step, it is not enough to equip students and lawyers to construct a dynamic tension between
legality and proactive lawyering. This capacity is a learned skill, and one that calls for a high
level of complexity of mind.294 The paradox literature provides a foundation for building a
lexicon of competencies that lawyers require to navigate this tension.
This Section sketches out competencies needed to navigate the lawyering paradoxes,
along with illustrative strategies for cultivating those competencies in law school. Going into
depth about how to develop these competencies is beyond the scope of this article. But this
framework hopefully provides a roadmap for building these competencies and, as a first, step,
making them a central part of what law schools seek to cultivate.

1. Identifying competencies related to managing paradoxes
Commentators have provided different but overlapping concepts for the capacity to hold
paradox. Peter Elbow begins with the capacity “to gain as many different and conflicting
knowings as possible:
People who are good at this seem to call upon some subtle tact, judgment, or intuition. I
think they are using a metaphorical, analogical, Gestalt-finding ability. They are good at
maintaining contradictory points of view simultaneously and at living with the
See, e.g., Sturm, supra note XX [Resolving the Remedial Dilemma]; From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers, supra
note XX; Sturm, supra note XX.
293 See, e.g., Sturm, supra note XX; Susan Sturm, Advancing Equality in and through Legal Institutions: A
Paradoxical Approach (work in progress).
294 See ANDERSON AND ADAMS, supra note XX; HEIFETZ, supra note XX.
292
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contradictory points of view simultaneously and at living with ambiguity in order to
refrain from premature resolution.295
The ability to hold paradox calls upon lawyers to develop what Lisa Lahey and Robert
Kegan call a self-transforming mind: a way of making meaning which requires the ability to:
“step back from and reflect on the limits of our own ideology or personal authority; see that any
one system or self-organization is in some way partial or incomplete; be friendlier toward
contradiction and opposites; and seek to hold on to multiple systems rather than projecting all but
one onto the other.”296
Adam Kahane draw on Keats’ concept of negative capability, also suggested by Elizabeth
Emens, to “maintain equanimity in a conflictual, uncomfortable situation where we don’t know
how things we turn out, or when, or even if we will succeed. The poet John Keats called this
“negative capability, which he defined as ‘being capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, and
doubts without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.” 297 The capacity to navigate
competing forces requires “conflict optimality: the ability to respond optimally in conflict by
navigating between different or competing motives and emotions and by combining different
approaches to conflict to achieve desired outcomes.” 298

2. Cultivating the capacity to hold paradox
The paradox literature has identified a set of strategies and capacities that can increase the
capacity of individuals, groups, and organizations to sit with the accompanying complexity,
emotional disruption, and uncertainty. Many of these are process strategies demand processual
responses.299

a. Reframing
One strand of research finds that developing common and expansive goals, which place
contradictions within a wider context, help actors accept paradox. That overarching goal can
provide frameworks that link the two conflicting modes of thought, as well as the motivation to
stay engaged in the face of tension. Elbow draws on his reading of Chaucer to illustrate how
paradox can contribute to reframing: “By setting up a polar opposition and affirming both sides,

Id. at 242.
ROBERT KEGAN AND LISA LASKOW LAHEY, IMMUNITY TO CHANGE: HOW TO OVERCOME IT AND UNLOCK THE
POTENTIAL IN YOURSELF AND YOUR ORGANIZATION 17 (2009).
297 KAHANE, supra note , at 81, quoting JOHN KEATS, THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS AND LETTERS OF JOHN
KEATS 277 (Boston).
298 Peter T. Coleman, Conflict Intelligence and Systemic Wisdom: Meta-Competencies for Engaging Conflict in a
Complex, Dynamic World, 34 NEGOTIATION J. 7 (2018).
299 Smith and Tracey, supra note, at 459.
295
296
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he lays the foundation for a broader frame of reference, ensuring that neither side can win. He
arranges the dilemma so that we can only be satisfied by taking the larger view.” 300
Framing is a skill that can be cultivated. The concept of braiding, introduced by Charles
Sabel, Robert Scott, and Ronald Gilson, offers one example of a reframe that enables legal actors
to link together cooperative and compliance strategies without losing the character of either.
Another example from my own work is the effort to reframe equality interventions as a way to
navigate a paradox that has previously been understood as a dilemma of difference with no
solution. Neither interventions that ignore differences nor those that focus on them are reliably
effective, as both can reproduce the very disparities they aim to eliminate. An alternative
intervention strategy, one that both ignores and focuses on differences, holds promise. This
strategy involves identifying features of the organization’s culture—its structures, practices,
norms, and patterns of interaction—that undermine its aspirational vision and, at the same time,
are on the critical path to employee thriving and success; changing those features in ways that
advance the vision and also reduce disparities in employee thriving and success; and monitoring
outcomes to ensure the intervention has its intended effects without reproducing disparities. 301
Another important reframing strategy involves moving across levels of analysis and the
locus of decision making. Paradox theory could usefully inform the work of the scholars that
have been seeking to expand beyond a court-centric approach to legal education, including
experimentalists, feminist scholars, critical race scholars, and law and society scholars.

b. Dealing with emotions
Another set of strategies focuses on addressing the emotional reactions evoked by
paradox, particularly uncertainty and anxiety. This focus acknowledges the importance, often
under-appreciated, of cultivating students’ capacity to deal with emotions generated by the
lawyering paradoxes—an aspect of learning that law schools and the legal profession tend to
discount. Law students and lawyers face a variety of emotional challenges which affect the way
they make meaning of their roles.
For example, confronting the gap between one’s sense of justice and justice as defined by
the court often provokes a range of strong emotions: anger, disgust, hopelessness, anxiety. The
immediate emotional tendency might be to lash out, reject, withdraw, or defend. The paradox
framework suggests that, rather than avoid or delegitimate those emotional reactions, the
capacity to act in the face of these contradictions requires the ability to recognize, acknowledge,
and experience those emotions, and to identify the needs and values that underlie those reactions.
That skill and capacity is one that can be learned. To be taken seriously by students, that learning

Elbow, supra note XX, at 240.
Sturm, supra note , at ; Heidi Brooks, Robin Ely, Lisa Lahey, and Susan Sturm, Organizational Culture Change
to Advance Workplace Equality, September 14, 2019 (unpublished proposal on file with the author).
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needs to take place in the context of conventional law school classes, as well as in the contexts
set up to build proactive lawyering skills.
A starting point for this capacity is building explicit attention to the skills of listening,
speaking up, providing feedback, and developing strategy, and focusing explicitly on the process
of shifting gears from one kind of listening and discourse to another. In a book called
“Collaborating with the Enemy,” Adam Keohane introduced the idea of stretch collaboration,
which “gives up the assumption of control.” Stretch collaboration advocates embracing both
conflict and connection, and “moving toward experimenting systematically with different
perspectives and possibilities” with the intention of staying “alert and courageous enough to
make a countervailing move when it is required, to notice and correct dynamic imbalance.”302
The idea of polarity management introduces a set of practices aimed at enabling people to shift
focus from background to foreground—a constant process of shifting back and forth from one
polarity to the other, along with the idea that these competencies take practice to develop.303
Clinical faculty members have been working with these concepts for decades, and have
much to others about how to build these competencies in the large law school classroom as well
as in leadership offerings.304 Basic skills that are the backbone of clinical teaching, such as
empathetic listening, developing mindfulness practice, cultivating empathy, interacting across
difference, cultural competency, and practicing nonviolent communication, provide a strong
foundation for a systematic practice of navigating paradox. Habits of mind developed, for
example, to develop cultural competency also cultivate students’ capacity to sit with difference,
understand its impact, and explore ways to make it a source of productive tension rather than
stereotyping and disconnection. 305 Particularly when these practices are linked to areas that
students view as core to their roles as lawyers—such as learning doctrine, participating in moot
court, navigating performance in an adversary setting, undertaking a major social change
initiative, or doing deals—these practices provide a concrete setting for learning how to sit with
intellectual and emotional discomfort, uncertainty, and conflicting feelings and practices, while
also engaging in conventional legal reasoning.
Paradox scholars and practitioners have offered some promising directions for
experimentation with the development of the capacities needed to hold this complexity. 306 The
Immunity to Change framework developed by Lisa Lahey and Robert Kegan offers a practice,
starting with oneself, for building by creating opportunities to experience and learn from optimal
conflict, which they define as:
•
•

The persistent experience of some frustration, dilemma, life puzzle, quandary, or personal
problem that is . . .
Perfectly designed to cause us to feel the limits of our current way of knowing. . .

JOHNSON, supra note , at.
Id.
304 See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note ;
305 Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33 (2001).
306 ADAM KEOHANE, COLLABORATING WITH THE ENEMY: HOW TO WORK WITH PEOPLE YOU DON'T AGREE WITH OR
LIKE OR TRUST 9 (2017).
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•
•

In some sphere that we care about, with . . .
Sufficient supports so that we are neither overwhelmed by the conflict nor able to escape
or diffuse it.307

I been struck by the power of the Immunity to Change framework, which I employed in both
Lawyer Leadership and Lawyering for Change, to build students’ capacity to take risks, hold
complexity, and deal with contradictory yet interdependent goals and patterns. By inviting and
enabling students to push themselves, reflect, and link these capacities to their core aspirations as
lawyers, law schools can cultivate the capacity to hold paradox.

c. Holding both fixed and growth mindsets
Navigating lawyering paradoxes also requires the capacity to hold competing mindsets, to
manage a fraught relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and to build
relationships of trust with people that you also compete with or don’t fully trust. Some aspects of
this tension stem from policy choices (such as the curve, the timing of on campus interviewing
by law firms, and law schools’ preoccupation with US News and World Report Ratings) which
could and should be changed to better support the capacity to navigate paradox.
In the meantime, there is much to be learned from innovators who have found ways to
support students’ development of a growth mindset alongside a culture of competition, and to
value intrinsic markers of meaning even as students grab for the gold rings. Again, Professor
Elizabeth Emens’ practice is instructive. A visiting scholar who observed Professor Emens class
described the strategies that she put into place that enabled students both to push themselves and
to support each other, to experiment and fail while experiencing this process as part of their
learning:
You facilitated our learning through a wide range of legal and non-legal materials as well
as experiential exercises—most of which were totally new to me—that appealed to a
wide range of personalities and practice types. Quite deliberately, it seemed, you
refrained from “evaluating” the students' engagement in the course by inserting your own
personal views . . . unless it was absolutely necessary to make intellectual connections or
steer the class in a productive direction. This is one of the reasons that I described your
pedagogy as "democratic," as well. While you were clearly our teacher and guide through
the course materials, I really appreciated that you made efforts to equalize the
traditionally hierarchical relationship between a law professor and her students as much
as possible. Likewise, you tried to ensure relatively equal speaking time between students
in order to promote a non-hierarchical learning space without domination by anyone,
whether professor or student. Form mirrored content here. You were personally
modelling (or appearing to model) best practices of mindfulness to the extent that you
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tried to facilitate more open, creative, and non-judgmental awareness among students as a
fellow contemplative practitioner in the classroom.308

d. Pursuing justice through lawyering in the face of law’s injustice
It is not enough to engage in critique of judicial doctrine or to bemoan the politicization
of the federal judiciary. To stave off cynicism and sustain engagement in pursuing justice,
students require the opportunity to exercise concrete ways that lawyers can pursue both types of
justice—both in and out of court.
The paradox framework can be helpful here. When a contradiction emerges between our
conception of justice and that contained in more traditional legal processes, how do we
understand that contradiction? How might we reconceive the meaning of authority, the locus of
decision-making, the participants in the process, to enable a process of imagination operating
alongside legality? To what extent can and should that process connect directly to law’s more
formal practices of legality? Where and how else do lawyers, courts, agencies, and legal actors
address these problems? What does this kind of problem solving and norm generation look like?
Who participates in it? How is it supported or undermined by conventional forms of legality?
Should these forms of proactive lawyering push us to redesign our understanding of the meaning
of courts and legality, or should they operate separately? How will they affect each other?
Serious engagement with these questions will require more capacious materials, forms of
pedagogy, and relationships, but conventional teaching can pave the way for those more
fundamental changes. Positive deviants in our midst have already begun that work. The question
is how can we take these experiments in the margins and bring them to the center of legal
education, while maintaining the widely shared commitment to honing methodological doubt.

C. Designing for Paradox
The strategies discussed thus far target individual faculty members and students, who can put
those strategies into use without major change in the law school environment. Those local efforts
matter. They enable enterprising faculty and students to cultivate the capacity to navigate
paradox without the kind of culture change that is both so necessary and difficult to achieve in
law schools. But without a change in the larger context, these experiments will remain marginal,
and many students are likely to continue to find themselves stuck in counter-productive
contradictions rather than dynamic tensions.
For these spaces to take root and produce sustainable change, innovation must operate on
multiple levels simultaneously, and across different time horizons. Individual students, faculty,
and lawyers require strategies that will enable them to navigate these tensions from the time they
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enter law school. Teachers require frameworks, strategies, and tools that they can use in the
classroom and in programs operating within a culture organized around legality. Institutions and
their leadership require ways to push toward transformative change, in an environment that
resists change and where the commitments to the status quo are deeply rooted.
The paradox literature offers a third overall approach that could help break out of this
pattern—designing for paradox. This step means building the environments and structures, and
“choice architecture” that will facilitate productive engagement with the contradictions and
connections between legality and proactive lawyering as part of solving problems. 309 For this to
take hold, it has to bring proactive lawyering from the margins to the center of legal education
and culture, and to connect to the sites and incentives that form students’ identities as lawyers.
This sounds daunting, but it need not proceed top down and whole hog. Experimentation
will be key to moving this strategy forward, as the paradox literature would predict. Scholarship
that models the use of design as a way to integrate legality and proactive lawyering provides a
jumping off point.310 Courses and programs that support an integrated experience for law
students offers one form of experimentation. A recent white paper called Re-Envisioning
Professional Education describes several initiatives underway that are experimenting with
building these kinds of learning environments, including at Northwestern and Stanford Law
Schools.311 The Davis Polk Leadership fellowships and innovation grants recently launched at
Columbia Law School offer another example of this kind of experimentation. Linking
experiential learning with classes focused on developing traditional legal skills.
Another strategy involves building cohorts of students, faculty, staff, and 312 lawyers who
are engaged in this kind of learning and practice, linking them with each other, and identifying
core examples in the law school. 313 Courses and research that rely on collaboration as the way to
develop legal skills could include modules that equip students to collaborate, and thus enhance
both lawyering and leadership capacities. The institution might create incentives for people in
different roles and with different skills and orientations to collaborate, and build those
collaborations into spaces where legality and leadership both operate. Long term sustainability
and impact depends upon linking these innovations to core activities that define the culture and
values of the law school and the legal profession.
Experimentation has the virtue of proceeding initially without requiring wholesale change
at the outset, allowing learning to take place, building communities of practice interested in
learning with and from each other, and laying the foundation for the kind of learning required to
hold paradox. Support from law school leadership, however, is key to sustaining these
See Underhill, supra note XX; Ayres and Braithwaite, supra note XX; Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (1987).
310 See, e,g, Hagen, supra note XX.
311 Austin, Chu, and Liebman, supra note, at 15-16.
312 Columbia Law School, Davis Polk Leadership Initiative, https://www.law.columbia.edu/about/deanwelcome/about-dean/leadership-initiative-columbia-law-school.
313 CUNY modeled this strategy at the institutional level by introducing “houses” as a core building block of
learning—groups of approximately 20 students who worked through problems with a faculty member, who acted as
a senior lawyer—one with time and commitment to teach their juniors. Lesnick, supra note , at 1187.
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experiments and building them into the fabric of the institutions. Doing this work can feel
emotionally draining and somewhat risky for students, faculty, and lawyers, but remains critical
to being able to meet the challenges that face law students and the legal profession. Their success
depends upon opportunities for thoughtful experimentation, supported by environments that
make it possible to fail and recover. This kind of support enables the creation of routines and
forums where conflict and cooperation can operate together or in tandem—another strategy that
has some support from the paradox literature. 314

CONCLUSION
The paradox idea affords a way to move forward in the face of daunting challenges
facing law schools and the legal profession. I do not mean to suggest that the ills of legal
education and the legal profession can be cured by learning how to navigate lawyering
paradoxes. Many scholars and commentators have documented structural problems that
contribute to students’ disengagement and mission drift; the failure to provide access to justice
for those without wherewithal to pay for a lawyer, the unhappiness of lawyers, and the low level
of trust and legitimacy in the legal system are just a few.
What the paradox idea does is provide a way to start small and think big. In the process
of building the capacity to hold paradox, the potential lies to enable lawyers to reimagine
institutions while operating within them. These pockets of innovation hold potential as
fractiles—“infinitely complex patterns that are self-similar across different scales. They are
created by repeating a simple process over and over in an ongoing feedback loop.”315 This is the
mirror image of Howard Lesnick’s brilliant use of William Blake’s metaphor of infinity in the
grain of sand.316
The paradox idea, with its emphasis on holding unresolved tensions and experimenting,
invites the conscious construction of spaces that can hold legality and proactive lawyering, and
link this multiple consciousness to the pursuit of justice. It also builds the capacities needed to
address the intractable problems and deep polarization facing the world. Linked to each other
and made visible, these experiments hold promise as a launchpad for law schools to equip law
students and the profession to make meaning of the contradictions built into law. This is what is
necessary to realize law’s promise.
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HALL, supra note, at 733
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ADRIENNE MAREE BROWN, EMERGENT STRATEGY 51 (2017).
This poem, quoted by Lesnick, has become an organizing frame for thinking about multi-level change:
To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower
Hold Inifinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour.
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1979).
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